The Narco Terrorism Connection

The link between drug trafficking and terrorist groups
is often called "narco-terrorism". The expression,
coined in 1984 by the then U.S. ambassador
Colombia Tamb Lewis, now characterizes those
terrorist groups that participate directly or
indirectly in the cultivation, manufacture, transport
and / or distribution of drugs and
earnings resulting therefrom. It can also distinguish
the involvement of terrorist groups in
taxation, protection or assistance to drug traffickers
for the purpose of providing, or funding, other
terrorist activities.
The relationship between insurgent groups and terrorist
and criminal organizations can be traced back to
three categories:
• mutually beneficial alliances for terrorists
and criminals;
• direct involvement of terrorist groups in
criminal activity;
• replacement in the terrorist group, motivation
ideology with that criminal. Note, in
this regard, that this does not necessarily imply
the end use of terrorist practices.
On the contrary, these are still used,
but change the purpose.
A good example is offered by the FARC,
Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia Revolutionary, and
other guerrilla groups and the Colombian paramilitaries,
the control of which approximately 40% of the national territory
incorporates a substantial role in the profitable traffic
of drugs to the market north
U.S., estimated at more than 80 tons of cocaine
the year and in 10 of heroin.
Historically, the Colombian guerrilla groups
have been able to fit into this lucrative trade
due to the elimination of the two big cartels
drugs (those of Medellin and Cali) who controlled
the production and trafficking of cocaine
Colombian until the mid-80s. at first,
the FARC were limited to tax both the producer and the
Buyer of Cocaine base, providing
guarantee security in the territory under their
travel check. In case, then, the traffickers wanted
make use of land in the hands of the group to
take off planes loaded with goods, then had to
pay an additional fee. However, it was also thanks
gains resulting from these taxation that
FARC and other groups, have changed their
strategy from the simple and indirect taxation
of the goods to the position of intermediaries between
producers and buyers: all the farmers who cultivated
drugs in areas controlled by
FARC had to sell their goods at a price
fixed. The FARC took charge then sell them
Once the cocaine base to the buyers. In the course of
the second half of the '90s, this process
has evolved and the FARC have begun to set up in
2000 its production plant, guaranteeing
thus more revenue, so that today it is estimated that
the guerrilla group revenues from the sale of drugs
about 60% of their earnings, estimated at about 300
millions of dollars a year. As can be seen, then,
the FARC have gone from first to second
category above, by mutual alliance between terrorists
and criminals to a direct involvement of
early in the activities of the latter.
Although it is almost impossible today to reply
with certainty the following question, you may
ask if the FARC are also entered in the third
category, abandoning, if not officially,
at least in practice, the ideological motivation
of their struggle in favor of more prosaic and economic
reasons. The question arises when you think about the enormous
amount of land put under cultivation of plants
of cocaine, heroin, and to a lesser extent, in the territory
under their control in the years (1999-2002) in which
the Colombian government had offered the group
42,000 sq km of the DMZ as an incentive
for the negotiation of peace: satellite imagery, in
1999 recorded 6,000 hectares of coca plantations,
that have become 16,000 in 2002, and these are
are also added 400 hectares of poppy
opium. In fact, the involvement in a traffic
peculiar as that of drugs has affected
also on the interests and goals of these terrorist groups
that, in some cases, have lost sight of those
who had their initial political objectives, to focus
material and economic benefits arising
from the proceeds of drug trafficking. In this regard,
can be made to fall into the third category a
group as the IMU - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
- Which, though always been involved in
drug trafficking through the region in recent
years appears to be more focused on protecting their
routes of drug trafficking to claim that
concrete political goals.
From the two short examples outlined above, it is possible
argue that the different degrees of involvement of the
terrorist groups in drug trafficking, in the different stages
This is expressed, may also depend on factors
"Agricultural", such as the presence on the territory controlled
by terrorist groups of crops (poppy
opium, marijuana, cocaine) or by geographical factors, the
done, that is, that their area of operations and of interest
whether or not transit region.
In these cases, as seen, the groups can enter
in the drug trade itself as
intermediaries or by exploiting their control
to impose territorial protection fees to producers.
In both cases, the aim is to use
income from drug trafficking to their advantage.
A further method, in addition to those already described
brokerage and taxation is one of the
exchange between drugs and weapons as demonstrated, for example,
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA),
in the 90s. The involvement in this fruitful
mechanism is also possible for terrorist groups
that there are neither in producing countries or in countries
transit and I am referring, for example, the IRA - Irish
Republican Army - or ETA - Eustaki Ta Askatasuna.
Their disadvantage "geo-strategic" does not imply that
these groups do not use the drug trafficking
to finance: on the one hand, a seller
can provide the group with the weapons they want, combining
to them a certain amount of drugs, provided that
the buyer to ensure the performance of the resulting gain
from the sale of the drug; the other
can be made joint-ventures between traffickers
drug and terrorist groups in which the first
provide the weapons and the second one to his own way
access to safe circuits washing of dirty money.
This second hypothesis, however, can not always
be welcomed to criminal organizations.
In today's world of "fighting terrorism"
can be very dangerous for criminal groups
help or deal with the terrorists with the
police forces and intelligence agencies concentrated
in the task of prosecuting terrorists, organizations
criminals that they remain distant
more room for maneuver and a somewhat greater
security. This, however, does not necessarily
say that you should exclude a priori contacts
or collaborations.
Islamic terrorism
One of the reasons that have brought to light the
links between terrorism and drug trafficking is linked to the
Afghan issue. After September 11, in fact, a
of the key questions of the fight against terrorism has been
they could have influenced the proceeds
financing from the sale of opium in Afghanistan
of these attacks. Afghanistan was, as
by the late '70s, one of the largest producers
opium poppy and can become, at the end
90s, the main exporter, supplying
more than 70% of the opium destined for Western markets
and especially to European: its production
reached record levels in 1999, with over
4000 tons. It now appears that this data is
was passed in 2004, with a production that
looks can be estimated at between 5400 and 7200
tons. It is interesting to note that the higher yields
have occurred regardless of the rise to
power of the religious regime of the Taliban, who regarded
these crops "ungodly." Indeed, blocking of production
imposed by the "students" in Kabul in 2000,
own, officially, for religious reasons, it seems
more due to an excessive fall in the price
Sales of goods than a real desire to eliminate
the cultivation of the country. The poppy
opium, also does not have expiration date, so the
amount stored in the previous year could
be sold when the price was raised
enough to reach levels considered sufficient.
In this context, the Taliban imposed a
particular type of taxation such that a part
the goods were taken from the system and re-sold
directly to the heroin labs, while a
subsequent taxation was imposed on transport. The
proceeds of this traffic were probably reinvested
both in the purchase of arms, and to allow
the operation of the administrative structures.
It seems unlikely that the Taliban were using
these revenues to finance the terrorist network of Al
Qaeda, which could count on far more profitable
sums deriving from the personal assets of
Osama bin Laden, from money laundering,
extortion, loans to others, and richer,
were, by the system of hawala, and other. It is therefore
likely that, given the different sources that Al Qaeda
available to it, that of the opium trade in Afghanistan more
that was not a minor item in the general budget.
The dangers of narco-
Narco is then able to provide
terrorists cash money that can be reinvested
in the purchase of equipment necessary for the operations.
How much is this profit? making
estimate appears to be extremely complex, just
Due to the particular, and of course confidential nature
transaction in question. Is a frequently cited
United Nations report estimated that the proceeds of
drug trafficking in approximately $ 400 billion
year: this figure, which many believe exaggerated
by itself, is in any case to resize. The intervention
of terrorist organizations in the business
of drugs lies most of the time
at the beginning of the transaction, where, that is, the value of
goods - whatever it is - is a minor, just as
in the case of Afghanistan and in the FARC, in early
their involvement in the trafficking of cocaine. At this
By the way, would be a novelty, if confirmed,
the alleged direct role played by Al Qaeda in
retail dealing heroin in the cities of northern Italy
(CATS F., "Al-Qaeda in Italy," L'Espresso, November 18
2004), where the benefits to the terrorist organization
would be certain: economically, control, and
then the reinvestment of approximately 80% of the final price
of the goods and, in any case, even in the event of
arrest of their men, they would have the pos-
bility to carry out teaching, other detainees
in Italian prisons, radical Islam. It should be noted, in
this regard, that some of the bombers at the station
Madrid on 11 March 2004 were criminals
common converted to radical Islam in prisons
Moroccan. The danger arising from these new converts
was also highlighted in the prisons of
USA. A further danger of narco-terrorism,
no less serious, is the possibility that this has to create
and / or fomenting chaos in all countries in which it operates, are
they those of production, transit or destination.
In particular, the destabilization may be a consequence
inadvertent presence of drug terrorism
in the case of an exaggerated response of the police
or the imposition of laws particularly
repressive. It may also be an option voluntarily
choice by the terrorist organization in order to
create a climate of insecurity that can foster and
protect their trade, as it is still in
some areas of Kosovo and Albania. In these attempts
destabilizing phenomena can also complemented
corruption and / or intimidation, undermining both
the credibility of public institutions, and their
ability and opportunity to respond.
The fight against drugs and the "war on
terrorism "
Criminal organizations and those terrorist
are more and more aware that users of
contemporary phenomenon that is globalization:
from the outset, their great flexibility and adaptability
has enabled both to overcome boundaries and barriers
linguistic, ethnic or nationalistic very rarely,
in the name of common interests. this has
led to an internationalization of almost all
illegal activities or terrorist organizations, which is why the
the fight against drugs, as well as the trafficking or
terrorism, takes place almost entirely beyond the boundaries
of a single nation.
Just make it so complex these global contacts
the task of the police forces and agencies
intelligence: the allocation of limited financial resources
and human resources available to the Member imposes
judicious choices of address political towards one or the other
face, that of drugs and criminal activities in
gender, or even terrorism. And the current moment
Town sees a strong concentration towards this
second threat to the security of nations.
As you can imagine, when the attention and
States' efforts are monopolized by the "war
terrorism ", it is easier for other transnational actors,
how criminal organizations move
unnoticed, or, at least, with greater freedom.
It is however said that the gangs represent
a lesser danger to the national sovereignty of
that terrorist groups: the goals are different, but
method - to gain control of an area for
be able to act freely in their business - it is very
similar and provides a total exclusion of the right to
state control. Wherever possible, therefore,
the need to combat terrorism should not
overshadow the serious danger posed
organized crime, including and especially the
light of what has been observed in recent years: a
substantial commonality of interests between the two phenomena.
The difficulties encountered by States are, on the one
part, to be able to harmonize the efforts of the unit
Police and intelligence agencies that normally
operate differently and, secondly, to be able to
economically cope with the complex challenges
both pose threats.
The transnational nature of the phenomenon creates further
question of being able to coordinate the work of the institutions
national laws and related regulations,
those with foreign and international.
Yet, despite all the difficulties present in
this "asymmetric warfare", the only possible answer
terrorism, and to those that have been defined
transmafie, is that states and international organizations
are aware of the challenge and take part in
together and actively in the struggle.
The Tri-Area Borders
In addition to those described above, there is another region where flow
the interests of organized crime and terrorist groups:
the so-called Tri-Borders area - TBA - ie the area of
three borders, those between Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina.
The small region is characterized by both the presence of various
Mafia organizations - these are mainly Chinese mafia,
Korean, Taiwanese and Lebanese - both from a relatively
top of belonging to a group of Islamic terrorism,
such as Hezbollah, Al Jihad, Hamas, Al Gama'a al-Islamiyya and
Al-Moqawama. In fact, the TBA, which has a population
total of about 700,000 people, reached 20/30.000 inhabitants
of Middle Eastern origin, especially the Palestinians and Lebanese.
The area is crossed by traffic of all kinds, mainly
counterfeiting of musical material and information,
trafficking in drugs and weapons. An interesting aspect is that of the
money laundering, which reaches very high figures
and is particularly the case in the Brazilian city of Foz do Iguaçu
and that in Paraguay, Ciudad del Este.