Civil nuclear

In the fall of 1956, the French Government, chaired by the Socialist Guy Mollet, pulled out of the drawer an old project, which he had secretly discussed in the previous months, and proposed two European partners (Germany and Italy) tripartite agreement for the atomic cooperation in the military field. The proposal was put forward after the failure of the Anglo-French expedition to Suez, at a time when France recalls Cacace, was engaged in the Algerian war and lamented the insensitivity of the Born to a question that the government of Paris considered vital. The reference to Suez confirms that the little war unleashed against Egypt by the two European powers with the complicity of Israel after the nationalization of the Canal was, along with that of Korea, the first major watershed in international politics after World War II. When the United States intervened and imposed the cessation of hostilities, Britain and France had opposite reactions. In London, the Conservatives chose a new prime minister in the person of Harold MacMillan, gave it a shot of throttle to decolonization and decided that the special relationship with the United States was more important than their old imperial dreams. France retained Guy Mollet to the head of the government and stubbornly decided that only nuclear weapons would allow her to not bend the head in front of America. The Tripartite Pact that Paris offered in those months to Germany and Italy's response to this need. The reader will find in this book the various stages of a negotiation that lasted two years and ended in April 1958 with two meetings of the three defense ministers: Jacques Chaban-Delmas for France, Franz Josef Strauss in Germany and Paolo Emilio Taviani for Italy.

In the first meeting, in Paris, was signed an agreement "for the development of research activities of the Institute of Saint Louis in Alsace where [were] likely including initiatives of study and experimentation in the nuclear field." In the second, in Rome, were approved collaborative initiatives in the field of conventional arms and was reached "a secret agreement for the construction of an isotope separation plant for the production of uranium enriched to Pierrelatte in France." The costs would have been incurred by 90 per cent by France and Germany to 10 percent from Italy. The Italian participation was modest, but it gave to the government, then headed by Adone Zoli, the ability to acquire information and materials.

The country, moreover, was now in a position to put it to good use. In 1952 he was created CNRN (National Committee for Nuclear Research), and had been entrusted with the construction of the first reactor. In 1956, at the Naval Academy, was put into operation the Camen (Center for the Application of Nuclear Force). The first results were visible in the following years. In 1958 began the construction of the power plant of Latin America, in December 1962, the reactor became critical and in May of the following year, as noted by Cacace, began the production of electricity. They were started at the same time work for another center, on the Garigliano, which would produce energy in January 1964 Meanwhile, two large private companies, Fiat and Montecatini, had fallen in the field. A research reactor was installed at Trino Vercelli and began producing power in 1964 then existed in Italy in the sixties, the conditions for a nuclear policy that would allow the country, among other things, to deal with much more confidence and independence the major energy crises of 1973 and 1979.
The military part of the program, however, had been abandoned along the way. The responsibility was primarily French. When he returned to power in May 1958, General de Gaulle wanted France denounce the Tripartite Agreement of the previous months. He did not believe that nuclear power would remain in the hands of an administration house and was determined to give his country a force de frappe exclusively national. Italy, meanwhile, ended up second the choice of de Gaulle. As soon formed his second government after the elections of May 1958 Amyntor Fanfani decided to cultivate the relationship with the United States and made ​​a trip to Washington in July, during which, among other things, tried to convince President Eisenhower that Italy in the Mediterranean would be the best partner of the Arab countries and would do in the interests of the West part of the "good matchmaker." Fanfani distrusted the policy of de Gaulle, but in many respects resembled him. He knew that the Arab policy of France was then strongly influenced by the Algerian question and believed that Italy, thanks to its "virginity" colonial and oil policy of Enrico Mattei, he could take his place. Not enough. Also wanted, as he used to say in those years, "move to the left axis of Italian politics" and wanted to ensure that the new course Eisenhower would not have affected the alliance with the United States. The Fanfani government lasted only a few months, but that of Antonio Segni, took office in February 1959, he completed the turn American of Italian foreign policy by negotiating with Washington, a few weeks after the installation of Jupiter missiles in the country. That was the moment in which Italy renounced implicitly to the European perspective of a bomb.

Meanwhile changed the attitude of public opinion towards nuclear weapons. Among the fallout immediately after the war and peace movements and those of the sixties there is an important difference. While the former were orchestrated by Moscow, with the support of the communist parties, and were motivated primarily by the fear that America took advantage of their superiority to destroy the USSR, the second mirrored sentiments prevalent in large sections of Western society. Stalin was dead, the "thaw" and détente had become everyday topics of political debate, nuclear testing and radiation represented an intolerable threat to human life and the environment. When an English philosopher, Bertrand Russell, took the helm of a great movement (the CND, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) and organized rallies that attracted tens of thousands of people, the governments of Western democracies realized they had to deal with opposition more important than it was ten years ago took to the streets to protest against the American atomic.

Then began the long negotiations for agreements, concluded in the following years, they would be suspended, restricted or banned the most dangerous nuclear tests. These agreements, of course, did not prevent the two major powers to modernize their nuclear arsenal and the nuclear club to expand progressively to new members, actual or potential: after France and China ("atomic" respectively since 1960 and 1964) also Israel , South Africa and later in India. That was the moment in which the United States and the Soviet Union realized they had the same interests and in fact agreed to work together on a treaty that would ban the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was signed on 1 July 1968 and forced Italy to exit from the uncertainties and ambiguities of previous years. If he had bowed to pressure from America, who asked insistently to sign, he would have given up, armaments, its nuclear ambitions in the previous decade.

The decision to sign was taken in early 1969 by a government in which the Foreign Minister was Pietro Nenni. For the big nuclear powers, interested in limiting the number of competitors, the Italian political climate could not be better: the dispute in universities, strikes in the factories, the socialists and the government, at the head of Italian diplomacy, a man who in the spring 1949, after the signing of the Atlantic Pact, had fought in Parliament against the "noose of alliances." Cacace notes that Italy, however, took some precautions and demanded a clause "European" with which "declared formally to renounce atomic force a national, but not in an atomic force the European Union, where the process of nuclear disarmament, international , had not been realized. "

Now required ratification. But the vicissitudes of Italian politics after the crisis of the center-left and the elections of 1972 had the effect of reopening the debate in the government about the choice of the atomic Italian foreign policy. There were still ambitious programs for the civilian use of nuclear energy. And a civilian program could always, if necessary, lapels and military implications. It was civilian or military, for example, the vessel Enrico Fermi (a unit of logistical support nuclear-powered) that the Navy had decided to build since December 1966? When the reactor vessel became critical and Italy tried to buy two tons of enriched uranium required for its operation, the United States argued that the project had military characteristics and denied their support. To some it seemed that no American and, in a few years, the first Indian nuclear test (May 1974) should have led Italy to be wary of the treaty by which the major powers wanted to enclose countries "minor". Among other merits of the book Cacace has to pay tribute to two diplomats, Roberto Ducci, Roberto Gaja, that in those months in the Italian government tried to provoke a final afterthought. Gaja, in particular, writing on "La Stampa" under a pseudonym (Roberto Guidi), he explained that the Indian nuclear tests would convince other countries of the Third World to seek energy independence: one more reason why according to the author 's Europe acquire a nuclear profile. While politicians belied the nuclear ambitions of Italy, a group of 142 scientists, including Edoardo Amaldi, urged the government to promote the ratification of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation. The approval of the Parliament was in April 1975 In the House, on that occasion, the Foreign Minister, Mariano Rumor, repeated that Italy, if the European Union had made a nuclear option, it would be considered free to participate in training of a European deterrent. But this statement of principle was of no effect whatever. Depriving themselves of the right to build nuclear weapons Italy could never throw on the scales, to convince Britain and France, the contribution of their own strength and their own expertise.

Much of what happened in later years, by the laborious energy programs adopted after the oil shocks of the fateful referendum in November 1987 with the programs of the "civil nuclear" were rendered impossible, is the result of two major waivers of the Fifties and Seventies. After being one of the most advanced and enterprising in the field of Nuclear Research, Italy had gradually dismantled its best institutions and it was out of one of the most promising and critical areas of modern science. The damage was irreparable. The country has lost prestige and bargaining power, has become, for its energy needs, dangerously vulnerable, no longer able to keep up with the science and technology of the most dynamic countries. Not enough. The arguments justifying these choices are blatantly contradicted by reality. The country that gave up nuclear arms in the name of peace is home to foreign nuclear bases. The country that has renounced the civil nuclear power in the name of health and the environment has been exposed to radiation from Chernobyl and import electricity from nuclear plants, a few hundred kilometers from its borders.