weapons of mass destruction

I.  INTRODUCTION  1.  In recent years, international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have once again gained momentum.  NATO, for its part, reiterated its commitment to these efforts in the new Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon in November 2010.  Seeking security at the lowest possible level of forces, “[a]rms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members.” NATO will thus “continue to play [its] part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts.” 2.  Most of the renewed attention has focused on nuclear and radiological threats.  However important this agenda is, it has somewhat diminished interest in the other two categories of WMD: biological and chemical weapons.  With concern high over the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, this is certainly understandable.   Nevertheless, further arms control, disarmament and non‑proliferation steps concerning biological and chemical weapons must be taken, in particular because the likelihood of biological and chemical agents falling into the hands of terrorist groups is arguably higher.  Indeed, international, national and private-sector measures aimed at stemming proliferation of such materials struggle to keep up with the rapid advances in the life sciences.  The year’s Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in December 2011 marks an especially important opportunity to rethink the international regime governing biological agents. 3.  In modern warfare, chemical weapons were deployed for the first time in World War I, and biological weapons just before World War II.  Today, the possession and use of these weapons is highly regulated under international law.  The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of either in warfare, and possession is further regulated by the 1972 BWC and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  While there is near-universal adherence to the CWC, the BWC is unfortunately less widely accepted. Several key nations including Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea and Syria have either not signed or not yet brought both treaties fully into force. 4.  Generally, chemical weapons are the easiest type of WMD to produce or acquire, but since they dissipate fairly quickly, they are potentially less catastrophic, depending on circumstances, than biological, nuclear and radiological weapons.  They proliferated widely in the 20th century and were deployed in a number of conflicts, from World War I to the North Yemen Civil War of the 1960s to the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.  Eradication efforts after the Cold War have been a success story, but many experts argue that the CWC must still be adapted to cope with the dynamic challenges of non‑proliferation once existing stockpiles have been destroyed. While Russia and the United States are committed to destroying the world’s two largest stockpiles and have made major progress, the destruction is behind schedule and their stockpiles remain significant. 5.  Biological agents are potentially far more dangerous and also less well-regulated.  While pandemic diseases have proven to be an effective mass killer over the centuries, today a biological attack would likely be bacteriological or toxin and, thus, geographically more limited in effect.  Still, the psychological effects of even a limited attack with few casualties could be great, possibly inducing widespread panic.  Nevertheless, biological agents are very difficult to efficiently deploy as weapons and can often be countered by inoculation and quarantine.  6.  For states that cannot compete with regional or global rivals by way of conventional or nuclear weapons, biological and chemical weapons can be seen as asymmetric deterrents.  Some countries, including China, Egypt, Israel, North Korea and Syria, are suspected to retain stockpiles or offensive programmes. Others have the capability to move forward quickly with programmes if they so choose.  However, the greater danger of use arguably originates from non-state actors, such as terrorist groups.  7.  Al-Qaeda has thus far been largely unsuccessful at developing such weapons, despite significant efforts and funds.  However, chemical and biological attacks have taken place in the last two decades, even though the difficulty of producing and using these weapons efficiently means that relatively few people have been killed.  The most lethal chemical attack happened when the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo killed 13 people when it released the chemical agent sarin on the Tokyo subway in 1995.  The most lethal biological attack occurred when anthrax spores were sent via mail in the United States in late 2001. This attack only killed five people, but the cost of handling the attack has been estimated at US$ 6 billion.[1]  Also, the threat of terrorists using biological or chemical agents to target agricultural production or food and water supplies should be closely monitored. 8.  Given these potential risks to homeland and international security, this draft General Report thus catalogues the current frameworks governing biological and chemical threats, discusses their potential weaknesses and suggests some ways forward to strengthen the relevant disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.  It also turns to the question of crisis response in case of a WMD‑related incident, whether intentional or accidental.  Particular attention throughout the draft report is paid to the interaction between the private and government sectors, as most of the science and technology that would have to be used in the production of biological and chemical weapons is of dual-use nature. 9.  This draft report has been prepared for the Science and Technology Committee (STC) as its 2011 General Report, to be presented at the NATO PA Spring Session in Varna, Bulgaria.  It continues the STC’s undiminished focus on WMD arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.  The draft report is intended to inform the ongoing debate on such efforts in the STC and the NATO PA as a whole.  This also allows members of the Assembly to feed these discussions back into their own national debates.  The draft report will be updated throughout the year to reflect ongoing developments, especially regarding the upcoming BWC Review Conference, as well as input from Assembly members at the Spring Session.  Moreover, given its crucial importance in countering biological and chemical threats, the Rapporteur will expand the analysis of crisis response and consequence management in cases of successful biological or chemical attacks, contained in the last section of the draft report. II.  THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS  10.  Biological and chemical weapons date back centuries, albeit in less sophisticated forms, and have been regulated under international law for a long time.  Although already prohibited by the 1899 Hague Convention, the use of poisonous gas was widespread in World War I.  As a result, the international community came together to sign the Geneva Protocol in 1925.  It banned the use in war of asphyxiating or poisonous gas, liquids, materials and devices, as well as bacteriological methods of warfare and obligated parties to the treaty to promote universal membership.  However, the possession, stockpiling and deploying of weapons were not prohibited.  During World War II, the only country to use biological weapons was Japan, dropping ceramic bombs filled with plague agents on Chinese soil.  Still, many countries conducted research and built up stockpiles during and after the war. Chemical weapons were not used during World War II, even though a number of countries possessed, developed or researched them. 11.  Biological and chemical weapons are, in the main, regulated by the BWC and CWC respectively, but also by additional international measures.  The following section of the draft General Report lays out these governing frameworks.     A.  BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS  12.  The 1972 BWC, which entered into force in 1975, bans member countries from developing, acquiring, producing, or stockpiling biological weapons.  While the CWC and the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty have near-universality, 32 states have not ratified the BWC, although 13 of those have signed it.  Under the treaty, countries are still allowed to maintain defence programmes against biological attacks.  It must be noted, however, that the knowledge gained and the technology developed in such programmes could potentially be used for malicious purposes.  13.  Weaponized biological agents can be divided into anti-personnel, such as anthrax bacteria, designed to kill humans, and anti-agriculture, such as Agent Orange, designed to destroy crops, but often also harming humans.  They can be delivered with advanced technologies such as missiles, but also as simply as powder in a mailed envelope.  Aerosol delivery is the most effective method of delivery so far, as most agents – toxins are an exception – are living organisms and are vulnerable to environmental stress.  However, this method is also the most complicated and difficult to achieve.  For example, it is difficult to efficiently reduce and separate particles and spores, and, even if released most efficiently, the spread and persistence of biological agents is highly dependent upon weather conditions.  Missiles and other warfare munitions are generally ineffective for delivering a biological weapon because the heat of the blast normally kills the organism. 14.  There are four types of biological weapons, whose usefulness as weapons vary by virulence, infectiousness, stability and ease of production; Bacterial agents, such as those that cause anthrax, can be very resistant in spore form and can thus be effective weapons; Viral agents, like the virus that causes smallpox, are difficult to cultivate, but can have potentially devastating effects; Rickettsiae, for example those that cause typhus, tend to be more susceptible to antibiotic treatments; and Biological toxins are poisonous substances created by living organisms, although some can be synthesized, for example botulinum toxin, which in minute doses is sold as Botox for cosmetic treatment.[2] 15.  The Convention, unlike the CWC, does not have a permanent secretariat or strong verification mechanisms.  Review conferences are held every five years, but separate, intersessional meetings of states parties and experts are held annually, addressing implementation, safety and security measures and proposals for improving the treaty.  The Seventh Review Conference will be held in December 2011, with a preparatory committee meeting taking place in April 2011. 16.  The review conferences have led to limited institutionalization.  Since the 1986 Review Conference, voluntarily confidence-building measures have been promoted.  Seven categories of confidence-building measures exist:  exchanges of data and information on a) research centres and laboratories, b) national biological defence research and development programmes as well as c) outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins; d) active promotion of contacts; declarations of e) legislation, regulations and other measures, f) past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes as well as g) vaccine production facilities.  More than 100 countries have submitted to such measures.  Not all, however, do so on an annual basis.  Encouragingly, 2010 saw a record-high participation rate, with 70 of the 163 member states submitting to such measures.   17.    The 2006 Review Conference established an Implementation Support Unit at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs inGeneva.  Consisting of a staff of three, it provides support for confidence-building measures, national implementation, efforts to obtain universality as well as administrative support. 18.  In the 1990s, states parties began to negotiate a stronger verification mechanism, an integral element for most arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.  However, the US withdrawal of support for a draft protocol at the 2001 Review Conference dealt a major blow to such efforts.  At the time, the United States argued that an enforcement mechanism would be counter to US business and biodefence interests and that it would not prevent the proliferation of biological agents suitable for weapons.  Still, it is not clear whether a protocol would have been feasible even if the United States did support the protocol, given a host of other problems, such as the dual-use nature of many biotechnologies, i.e. the fact that scientific research and development can be used for both good and malicious purposes, and the wariness of certain states to share information on technology. 19.  Nevertheless, states parties may request formal consultative meetings to address compliance concerns, a mechanism developed during the review conferences.  This has been used once, by Cuba, in order to address its allegation that a US crop-dusting aircraft in 1996 released an insect pest over Cuban territory.  Eleven third-party countries submitted written observations: Eight concluded that no causal link existed between the flight and the infestation; two concluded that there was not enough evidence; and North Korea found the United States culpable. 20.  Western countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom and France, destroyed their biological weapon stockpiles several decades ago.  However, many countries are in possession of highly contagious biological organisms.  They are intended for research purposes, but many could be weaponized and used for malicious purposes if proper safeguards are not in place. Notably, the United States and Russia have delayed destroying their last samples of smallpox after a highly successful worldwide eradication effort, even though many experts have called for their destruction.[3]  21.  Open-source information on national biological weapons programmes is limited, especially for countries not party to the convention. At this time, North Korea, a party to the BWC, is thought to possibly have an active offensive biological weapons programme.  Israel has not signed the BWC, and while Arab states have charged that Israel has a biological weapons programme, it may only have a passive, defensive programme, given the suspected former and current programmes by states in its neighbourhood.  The United States has in the past alleged that China has a small‑scale offensive programme and applied non-proliferation sanctions. The United States also considers that Russia has not satisfactorily documented the destruction of its inherited Soviet biological weapons. Countries such as China, Iran, Russia and the United States conduct dual-use biological research programmes. In the past, the United States, has argued that Cuba may have had a biological weapons programme, although in more recent estimates it has judged Cuba to be compliant with its treaty obligations.  Cuba is one clear example of a country that has a sophisticated biotechnology industry that could be used to create offensive weapons if political leaders decided to do so.  22.  The successful development of biological weapons by states parties after the entry into force of the BWC highlights the fragility of the current treaty framework.  The Soviet Union developed an extensive biological weapons programme in the 1970s and 1980s, despite being party to the Convention, as did apartheid South Africa and Iraq under Saddam Hussein.  The BWC has therefore not been as successful as it was hoped for or as successful as the more recent CWC.     B.  CHEMICAL WEAPONS  23.  The state of the CWC is stronger than that of the BWC.  Its accomplishment is great, as chemical weapons, which are the category of mass casualty weapons that was most used in warfare and terrorism in the 20th century and spread to the greatest number of countries, from Albania to Australia, has been eradicated in most of the nations that once held stockpiles.  24.  The CWC was signed in 1993.  When it entered into force in 1997, this started a process in which countries declared their holdings of chemical weapons and began destroying arsenals and production facilities. Today, it has achieved near-universality with 188 members, out of a possible 195, a further two have signed, but not yet ratified the Convention.  Unlike the BWC, the CWC has an implementing body in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).  The OPCW has a permanent international secretariat in The Hague, led by a director-general. 25.  As mandated by the CWC, states parties have established national authorities to implement the treaty.  The treaty also created a detailed verification scheme.  The OPCW inspects both facilities that produce chemicals that have previously been used in chemical weapons production as well as facilities that produce chemicals that have not been used in military production, but are nevertheless of concern to states parties.  There are roughly 5,000 factories in the latter category.  With only 127 inspections every year, there is therefore some risk of evasion of treaty commitments. 26.  In addition, any state party suspicious that another is pursuing a chemical weapons programme can request the director-general to send an inspection team, with states parties having no right to refuse inspection – a mechanism that has never been used, however. 27.  After signing the Convention, seven countries declared chemical weapons under the treaty.  Russia and the United Statespossess the vast majority of the world’s chemical weapons.  Charged to destroy these large stockpiles built up during the Cold War, both are behind schedule, however, and the process is likely to last another decade.  The United States has destroyed more than 85 per cent of its stockpiles.  Mandated to finish by April 2012, due to funding cutbacks and other issues, the destruction of the last of its weapons is only anticipated in 2021.  Russia has destroyed roughly half of its stockpiles and will miss the same deadline. 2015 is its new self‑imposed deadline to destroy the approximately 20,000 tons of remaining weapons. Iraq had an extensive chemical weapons programme under Saddam Hussein, even though it was not active in the later years of his rule.  The country’s new government joined the Convention in 2009 and declared weapons and facilities, but has not yet begun destroying its chemical stockpiles.  Albania, India and South Korea completed destroying their chemical weapons in the last four years.  28.  The seventh country that declared chemical weapons holdings is Libya, which deserves a special mention, given the current situation in the country.  Libya is considered a notable success story in non-proliferation efforts, as it agreed to give up its WMD-related programmes in 2004.  Today, however, it still retains a small amount of mustard gas, having been granted a deadline extension for destruction until December 2011.  With Colonel Qaddafi’s rule threatened by a major uprising from mid-February 2011, some worry that he could deploy chemical weapons against civilians or anti-government forces or that the chemicals could fall into the hands of terrorists.  The United States maintains that it would be difficult to militarize the remaining stockpile, but American and European leaders still express concern.  Both France and the United Kingdom have threatened prompt reprisals in case of a chemical attack.  The weapons necessary to deliver the gas have been destroyed.  It is thus uncertain that Colonel Qaddafi would be able to use the gas, even if he wanted to.  Indeed, Paula DeSutter, the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation in the George W. Bush Administration, argues that “[y]ou can't say that what's left there is ash and trash, but pretty close.”[4] 29.  The treaty is still not universal, but only seven countries have not ratified the CWC:  Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia and Syria.  Israel and Myanmar have signed but not ratified the CWC.  North Korea is believed to possess undisclosed chemical weapons or programmes.  There is also serious concern that Syria may be developing a capability for chemical weapons.  Indeed, in 2004, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said that his country had a right to develop and maintain the capability for biological and chemical weapons.  Evidence suggests that both Israel and Egypt had active offensive programmes in the past, but their programmes may be exclusively defensive in nature now.  Some judge that Egypt could be in compliance with the treaty if it wished to sign and ratify.  Weapons were reportedly used in the Angolan civil war, but the country is not believed to possess them now.[5] 30.  China and Iran, which are states parties, may also have undisclosed chemical weapons or programmes. The US State Department’s most recent overview of compliance also concluded that it could not confirm whether Russia ’s declaration was fully complete. 31.  Related to current events, several doctors have alleged that Yemen ’s government used nerve agents against protestors in the ongoing demonstrations of 2011. The government has denied this, saying that they used legal varieties of tear gas and that demonstrators had taken drugs that simulated the effects of chemical weapons.  Chemical weapons have been used in Yemenbefore by Egyptian forces during the civil war in the 1960s. This case highlights the fact that it is difficult to ascertain cases of chemical weapons use under the treaty. 32.  The destruction of older chemical munitions is special case.  Hundreds of thousands of shells of chemical weapons abandoned in China by imperial Japan at the end of World War II remain in place.  Japan is tasked with the clean-up effort under the CWC, estimated at US$ 1.6 billion.  After years of delays, destruction began in September 2010, but the abandoned weapons remain a sore point in Sino-Japanese relations.  Australia is destroying US weapons left at a World War II military base.  Many weapons remain on European soil from World War I and efforts to locate and destroy them continue.  In the United States, during World War I, chemical weapons were tested in the Spring Valley neighbourhood of Washington DC, and unexploded ordinances were found decades later; clean-up continues.     C.  ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION MEASURES  33.  While the BWC and CWC are by far the most important frameworks for biological and chemical disarmament and non-proliferation, other initiatives exist that bolster the treaties. 34.  Most crucially, in 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540, as enforceable international law, on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  The resolution obliges states to refrain from any means of supporting non-state actors in developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using WMD as well as their delivery systems.  States are required to establish domestic controls to prevent proliferation.  A "1540 Committee" has been tasked to collect comprehensive reports from states’ parties on progress towards the implementation of mandatory steps.  One hundred and sixty three states and the EU have so far submitted national reports on the implementation of the resolution.  In its second report to the Security Council in 2008, the committee noted progress, but also underlined that much more needed to be done.[6]  Crucially, it is still unclear how non-compliance with the resolution can be defined, identified and dealt with.  The mandate of the resolution has been extended until the end of April 2011.  While it had not yet been renewed at the time of writing, renewal is expected.  35.  The Proliferation Security Initiative was launched in 2003 under the leadership of the United States.  It is an informal arrangement of over 90 states that aims to stop shipments of WMD, as well as delivery systems and goods to produce such weapons, to countries of concern for participants in the initiative.  Member states have pledged to act when necessary to help seize or foil dangerous trade at sea, in the air or on land and readily share information among one another.  36.  The Australia Group is a key multilateral forum for the non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and their delivery systems.  The group harmonizes export controls to ensure that exports do not lead to the development of biological or chemical weapons.  It includes all 27 European Union member states, the European Commission, and 13 other countries, including Argentina,Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine and the United States.  The informal group meets annually to assess how national-level export licensing measures can be made more effective in non-proliferation efforts.  37.  NATO has also increased its institutional engagement on WMD. In 1999, it launched its Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative. Under the initiative, the Alliance is integrating its political and military work in non-proliferation efforts, giving strong support to a variety of arms control and non-proliferation regimes and outreach to partners and relevant international organisations.  The Lisbon Summit Declaration in 2010 also called for the full implementation of Resolution 1540 and tasked the North Atlantic Council to assess and report, before the June 2011 meeting of Ministers of Defence, on how NATO can better counter the threat of WMD and their means of delivery.  38.  The EU, for its part, supports the BWC through joint actions, operating through the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs inGeneva.  Since 2006, EU member states are obligated to submit annual confidence-building measures. III.  THE CURRENT STATE OF ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND NON‑PROLIFERATION EFFORTS  39.  Neither biological nor chemical weapons have openly or indisputably been used by states in warfare in the last two decades. Clearly, a strong international norm exists that considers the use of either unacceptable.  International stockpiles have been greatly diminished, with many states renouncing and destroying their weapons.  Terrorists have also largely failed to weaponize biological and chemical agents.  Indeed, the most successful and costly biological terrorist attack, the anthrax letters of 2001, apparently came from a scientist at an American government laboratory who had access to the material.  Nevertheless, measures to counter biological and chemical threats still have to cope with numerous issues to become truly effective tools of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.     A.  BIOLOGICAL THREATS:  CORE ISSUES AND PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS  40.  Experts routinely recommend that more should be done to counter biological threats, at the national and international level as well as in the private sector.  The Seventh Review Conference for the BWC provides an opportunity for the international community to take steps to make the world more secure from the threat of biological weapons under the treaty.  Moreover, it provides a natural point of reflection on the wider web of biosafety and biosecurity measures.           1.  REVIEWING THE BWC  41.  In general, significant challenges to a deeper BWC regime remain, for example due to the dual-use nature of biotechnology, biodefence programmes and lack of trust among different states.  In light of substantial differences on these and other issues, Paul van den Ijssel, the chairman of the Review Conference, has stated that the guiding principle for the preparatory work and the conference itself must be “ambitious realism.”[7] 42.  In the opinion of many observers, the BWC is in need of its own verification mechanism. The Third Review Conference in 1991 established the VEREX ad hoc group of experts to identify potential verification measures from the standpoint of science and technology, and in 1994 an ad hoc group was tasked with developing a legally-binding verification regime.  In 2001, however, the international community was unable to conclude negotiations on a draft protocol.  Some advocates of verification had high hopes for the Obama Administration, which has placed a strong priority on non-proliferation of WMD.  The Administration has focused on nuclear weapons, however, and no drastic change in the US approach on biological weapons has taken place.  At a December 2010 meeting under BWC auspices, the United States stated that “a verification regime is no more feasible than it was in 2001, and perhaps even less so, given the evolution of technology and industry.”[8]  The United States also fears that reopening the protocol question could weaken the treaty, as Russia seeks to define more closely what is banned by the convention.  For better or worse, a verification protocol is thus most likely off the agenda for the upcoming Review Conference. 43.  Instead, the Australia Group, consisting primarily of Western and wealthy countries, favours additional confidence-building measures and more effective export controls in order to strengthen biological non-proliferation efforts.  Russia and many of the 118 countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, however, are discontent with the tight export controls on dual-use items. Article X of the BWC gives states parties the duty to facilitate and the right to participate in “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.” Cuba has thus proposed establishing an institutional mechanism for peaceful co-operation, albeit in rather vague terms.  Iran, for its part, wants to dismantle the Australia Group entirely for ostensibly violating Article X.  Thus, the divide between wealthy countries prioritizing non-proliferation and developing countries wishing to benefit from technology sharing has been and co, ntinues to be a major challenge for the biological non-proliferation regime. 44.  G8 foreign ministers, representing Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, endorsed strengthening the BWC regime in strong but not particularly specific terms in a statement at a March 2011 meeting.  They cited the risk posed by the use of a weapon as a major issue for the international community, and said that “tangible progress with respect to increasing mutual confidence in compliance is very much needed.”[9]  Recommendations included: looking for “more effective ways to enhance assurance of compliance”; strengthening the current UN Secretary General mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use; renewing the Implementation Support Unit’s mandate and possibly consolidating it; regular submissions of confidence-building measures from states parties; and working for universality.  They also noted that “the involvement of civil society, particularly the academic and industrial sectors, is essential to the effective implementation of the provisions of the Convention,” and pledged to step up engagement with civil society and work to improve awareness of risk among the life science community. 45.  A 2009 report by the Arms Control Association, a US non-partisan organization that advocates more effective arms control policies, also recommends the strengthening of the UN Secretary General’s mechanism for investigation as a key step going forward.  The report suggests the UN training of a group of biological weapons specialists for a standby investigative capability and the securing of a UN Security Council commitment to consider the investigation of any alleged breaches. The report does acknowledge that sovereignty concerns are once again at the core of the problem in establishing such mechanisms.[10] 46.  At the time of writing, it is not entirely clear whether the BWC Review Conference will be a success or a failure, but those looking for major steps in tightening the international regime will most likely be disappointed.            2.  GOING BEYOND THE BWC: INITIATIVES AT THE NATIONAL AND MULTILATERAL LEVEL AND IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR  47.  In light of the shortcomings in the BWC and the low possibility that this will change soon, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts concerning biological agents must go beyond the treaty, including national, multilateral and private-sector initiatives.  Pathogen and laboratory safety measures, for example, remain insufficient in many countries, especially in light of the rapid advances in science and technology.  As scientists find it increasingly easy to synthesize deadly viruses, such as the Spanish influenza of 1917-1920 that killed more than 3 per cent of the global population, measures to control biological substances are struggling to keep pace, especially with regard to radical groups producing or acquiring biological weapons.  48.  At the national level, states have many tools in their arsenal to enhance the safety and security of biological agents.  In theUnited States, for example, the resources range from legislation and strategies to counter biological threats against civilians and agriculture to the National Scientific Advisory Board for Biosecurity, which advises government agencies.  The US National Security Council also published a National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats in November 2009.[11]  The strategy concentrates on three priorities: “(1) improving global access to the life sciences to combat infectious disease regardless of its cause; (2) establishing and reinforcing norms against the misuse of the life sciences; and (3) instituting a suite of co-ordinated activities that collectively will help influence, identify, inhibit, and/or interdict those who seek to misuse the life sciences.”  Public health rather than counterterrorism is prioritized in the strategy, which seeks to reduce threats from outbreaks of disease “whether natural, accidental or deliberate.”  National health and security actors must also co-operate amongst each other to handle potential threats and emergency situations.  The US Government Accountability Office therefore recommended in March 2011 the establishment of a mechanism to co-ordinate federal biodefense efforts.[12]  49.  Jonathan B. Tucker of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies is critical of the current disease-centric strategy of the United States, however, as coupling public health and national security tightly together may be counterproductive.[13] Ultimately, it could give “greater priority to infectious diseases that the developed world considers threatening […], at the expense of combating endemic diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria […].”  Furthermore, if the United States would put disease surveillance at the centre of its strategy for strengthening the BWC, it “would distract attention from the main challenge facing the treaty regime, namely ensuring that the member states comply with their obligations not to acquire or proliferate biological weapons.” 50.  National and multilateral efforts to reduce threats from Cold War WMD stockpiles or programmes are also seen as critical outside the BWC framework.  The US Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, for example, offers financial and technical assistance to improve security at facilities in the states of the former Soviet Union.  Even in a time of budget cuts, President Obama’s budget proposal increased spending on the biological part within the programme from US$ 169 million in fiscal year 2010 to US$ 260 million in fiscal year 2012.[14]  Particular efforts have also been aimed at preventing scientists who worked on weapons programmes in the Soviet Union from selling their knowledge to terrorists or states that wish to acquire weapons. The International Science and Technology Center in Russia, a multilateral organization founded in 1992, provides weapons scientists with job opportunities in the civilian scientific arena, and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine has a comparable mission.  The not-for-profit CRDF Global promotes international scientific and technological collaboration for similar reasons. The United States has also funded biodefence centers in several former Soviet states, including Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 51.  Outside the treaty, the influential Nuclear Threat Initiative, under the chairmanship of former US Senator Sam Nunn and CNN founder Ted Turner, recommends improving intelligence capabilities, tightening export controls, strengthening security measures at laboratories, reducing the vulnerability of buildings to attack, managing the consequences of an attack through early detection, disease surveillance and response, additional research for vaccines and medical countermeasures and the stockpiling of and ready distribution system for vaccines and drugs.[15]  The 2009 Arms Control Association report also recommended stronger approaches on the national level as well as the development of internationally harmonized standards – possibly by creating a working group under UN or BWC auspices, involving international scientific organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO), to develop such standards.[16] 52.  National strategies and multilateral governance are important, but biosafety and biosecurity measures must go beyond both the BWC and government responses.  Prevention of bioterrorism and crisis response requires efforts from the private sector, scientists, academia and non‑governmental organizations as well.[17]  Amy E. Smithson of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, for example, argues that “[i]n contrast to the tangled web of national review boards, professional societies, government bureaucracies, and years of review and negotiation often involved in creating treaties and the regulations constructed to implement them domestically, self-governance tools can be launched quickly.”[18]Nevertheless, she also notes that “governments can ill afford to abdicate the responsibility for managing bio-risk to the private sector.” 53.  Already, there is a wealth of freely available information on biosecurity from private sector sources, in addition to government resources.  The Federation of American Scientists, for example, has put together a valuable compilation of educational materials as well as the recently‑launched Virtual Biosecurity Center, an online resource for a wide range of biosecurity information.[19] 54.  Luckily enough, biological or chemical terrorism has not caused a major incident that would make it absolutely clear to scientists and governments of the potential of mass casualties from the work they do in the life sciences.  A cultural change must nevertheless take place in the discipline.  The development of a global code of ethics or conduct for scientists engaged in the life sciences has therefore been suggested by many.  Such a code would be less binding than a treaty, but stronger than a guideline, many institutions and organizations have already binding codes of conduct for members.  Several organizations have drafted or written biosecurity codes, including UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights in 2005.  Such codes emphasize working ethically for the sake of humanity and not misusing or allowing the misuse of research. The International Association of Synthetic Biology and another group of synthetic biology companies have established voluntary standards for companies to screen the genes that clients request to ensure that they are not used for malicious purposes.  Editors of a number of life science journals have furthermore adopted a security and safety review of articles, to prevent the publication of articles that could potentially aid terrorist networks.     B.  CHEMICAL THREATS:  CORE ISSUES AND PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS  55.  With significant progress made towards the eradication of chemical weapon stockpiles worldwide, the OPCW is looking forward.  In December 2010, the director general established an advisory panel of independent experts to make recommendations on the future priorities of the OPCW, which will submit a report in June 2011.  The director general calls this a time of transition for the OPCW: the goal of universality remains, while new focuses could include assisting in protecting chemicals and implementing national legislation, building capacity in countries, and export controls as well as developing a plan of how to handle non-state actors.[20] 56.  At the core of the CWC are the elimination of the still sizable US and Russian arsenals, the smaller ones in Iraq and Libya as well as the munitions left in China by imperial Japan; the signing and ratification of the CWC by all states; and, most importantly, adherence of all countries to the treaty. Moreover, countries will have to stay vigilant and guard against chemical terrorism. Nevertheless, the international chemical weapons non-proliferation regime is in good shape compared with its biological and nuclear counterparts. 57.  Convincing the seven states not party to the convention to join is still an important goal. Five countries (the Bahamas, theDominican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, and Lebanon ) have joined the Convention since the Second Review Conference in April 2008.  The prospects of North Korea joining the treaty are almost non-existent at this point.  Somalia lacks a government that could credibly pledge itself to the Convention.  However, if the military junta in Myanmar has a genuine interest in boosting its credentials in the wake of the very tacit opening towards electoral democracy, it might be persuaded to join the CWC.  Also, Angola has little reason to hold out and could potentially be induced to sign the treaty.  The cases of Egypt, Syria and Israel are interrelated.  Egyptinitiated a linkage policy, which called for Arab states to boycott the CWC until Israel committed itself to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  However, only Damascus still joins Cairo in this policy.  For Israel ’s defence strategy, chemical weapons are not particularly useful, and unilateral ratification has, in fact, been discussed in the government at times. Syria, on the other hand, is more reliant on chemical weapons as a security asset, and its leaders have defended their possession. A possibility that an agreement could be reached between Egypt and Israel, and possibly also Syria, exists, however, to join the convention and eliminate weapons political will needs to be present.[21] 58.  Another issue concerning the future of the chemical weapons regime, which has been widely discussed in expert circles, is the use of incapacitating chemical agents.  The CWC allows the use of chemicals such as tear gas for law enforcement, which includes domestic riot control purposes.  Many observers are concerned that this is a loophole.  Russian authorities used ‘non-lethal’ incapacitating agents, likely fentanyl, in situations where Chechen terrorists held hostages at the Dubrovka Theatre inMoscow in 2002 and at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia in 2004.  More than a hundred hostages died in each attack, many from the gas.  The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) held a conference in 2010 on the implications of such agents for international law, noting that ‘law enforcement’ may not be defined the same way by different countries and that the loophole could lead to the use of such agents in warfare and the weakening of the international law norm against chemical weapons.[22]  Some states parties raised the issue of incapacitating chemical agents at the Second Review Conference of the CWC in 2008, and it will likely be a topic at the Third Review Conference, that will probably be held in 2013. 59.  Discussion of the use of white phosphorus is also likely. The incendiary weapon is legal for use as a smokescreen in war.  If used against enemy fighters or civilians, however, it violates the CWC.  The United States was accused by Iran, for example, of violating the Convention with its use of white phosphorus in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, but the United States argues that it was only used legally.[23]  Israel used white phosphorus as a smoke cover in civilian areas in its December 2008 offensive in Gaza.  WhileIsrael apparently reprimanded a number of officers for excessive use, this is still likely to spur major disagreements. 60.  The Second Review Conference showed a divide between industrial countries focused on non-proliferation and developing countries focused on the disarmament of the United States and Russia.  At the Third review Conference, future spending levels of the OPCW will most likely be a major topic of discussion.  As of 2008, the organization had spent 85 per cent of its verification resources on monitoring the destruction of stockpiles.  With significant progress made in this area, funds could therefore be redirected towards verifying that industrial facilities do not produce chemical weapons or technical assistance. Alternatively, some funding could also be cut.[24]  61.  Given the increasing overlap between the fields of biology and chemistry, some, including the Science and Technology Committee in its 2009 General Report, have also argued for combining the BWC and CWC conventions, although several states have rejected this and the director general of the OPCW calls it unlikely.  The difference between the two types of weapons can be blurry;   toxins could be the concern of either convention, for instance.  If both conventions fail to cover the overlap between them, a gap could develop.  The CWC is moving towards completing the goal of destruction of weapons, and its primary goal will then switch to non-proliferation, the goal of the BWC.  Combining the treaties might be able to improve international regulation of biological weapons, which is the greater threat, when this has been difficult to achieve so far.  However, the political will to do so is lacking – one reason the CWC was so successful is that it was adopted in the 1990s at a high point in international co‑operation.  The dual-use nature of biotechnology makes biological weapons a particular challenge to regulate. After the December 2009 BCW meetings, Jonathan B. Tucker underlined that “[b]iological weapons are different from chemical and nuclear weapons, and need to be addressed in a different manner.”[25] IV.  CRISIS RESPONSES TO BIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL INCIDENTS  62.  In the event of actual usage of biological, and less so chemical, weapons by a state or terrorist, national and international emergency health structures, such as the WHO, would be essential in mitigating the consequences for the population.  63.  As in cyber warfare, a biological, and even a chemical attack can be suspected or determined, which can in itself be rather hard, but may be difficult to respond to because the origin of the attack may be difficult to ascertain.  The main priority, at least in the beginning, will be dealing with the effects of the outbreak on people, not with the attacker.  The WHO has virtually universal membership - even Taiwan was recently able to participate, and has thus a great advantage compared to other forums.  It has programmes, such as the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, in place to handle outbreaks of international significance. Indeed, global epidemic responses have been tested, with varying success, by the SARS and H1N1 epidemics in 2003 and 2009, respectively.  The United States supports discussions of international capacity‑building for disease-surveillance and response.  TheUS Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, for example, argues that, because “biological weapons attacks are not always readily identified as attacks, and that effective detection and response to an attack are only possible if there is an effective public health response,” it is “abundantly clear that this is our business.”[26] 64.  At the national level, the United States, for example, has multiple agencies that would be responsible in the event of a biological or chemical attack.  In case of a biological incident, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention directs the investigation of an outbreak, and, if the evidence suggests a deliberate release, it will ask the Federal Bureau of Investigation to open a criminal investigation.[27]  The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would ultimately be responsible for care of the population, while the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies would be involved in crisis management.  Through Project BioShield, launched in 2004, HHS has developed vaccines for avian flu, treatments for anthrax, botulism and other potential threats, and is building up a Strategic National Stockpile of vaccines and treatments.  The Army and Marine Corps both maintain special response units.  However, in a recent ‘report card’ issued in January 2010, a year after publishing their main report on the threat from biological weapons, a commission led by former Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent gave the US Government a failing grade for enhancing rapid response capabilities to prevent biological attacks from causing mass casualties.[28]  Gregory Koblentz and Jonathan Tucker note that the missions of the different actors involved in responses often do not align:[29]“Public-health and medical experts seek to diagnose the infectious agent responsible for an outbreak, treat the victims and prevent further spread; law‑enforcement officials strive to identify the perpetrator(s) and collect evidence that will stand up in court; and national policymakers want to determine the source of the attack so that they can take retaliatory action within a reasonably short period.” Inter-agency co-operation could thus be severely hampered, and more effective mechanisms for co-ordination are needed. 65.  For minimizing the human damage of a biological attack, efficiently developing, producing and distributing treatment will be essential.  With very high fixed costs in research and development, although fairly low variable costs for mass production due to economies of scale, the economics of vaccine production are not easy and there are few vaccine producers.[30]  Indeed, only one production line in the United States produced H1N1 vaccine during the outbreak in 2009,[31]and vaccine shortages have led to criticism of the government in many countries.  Some experts, such as the pro-market American Enterprise Institute, recommend less regulation and having the government reimburse people for vaccines rather than buy them up front.[32]  One major vaccine producer, GlaxoSmithKline, argues that technology transfer to developing countries that would produce vaccines domestically is suboptimal because of the difficulties of vaccine economics and production in developing countries, and stresses the need to keep borders open for supply chains in the event of a pandemic.[33] 66.  NATO, for its part, has a multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Task Force, designed to respond to an attack since 2003.  A Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence in the Czech Republic was activated in 2007.  It develops doctrines, standards and knowledge with the goal of improving interoperability and capabilities as well as provides training to the CBRN Defence Task Force and advises NATO and partners on CBRN issues.  In March 2011, NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme convened a workshop on CBRN in Haifa, Israel, discussing in particular the potential of Internet-based tools for responded to disease outbreak.  67.  In 2009, the European Defence Agency (EDA) started the Biological Detection, Identification and Monitoring Equipment Development and Enhancement Programme, an armaments programme designed to improve equipment for EU forces, enabling them to work in biologically hazardous areas. 68.  Dominique Loye and Robin Coupland of the ICRC have argued that “[a]t an international level, there are no plans for assisting the victims of a nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical (NRBC) event which are both adequate and safe.”[34]  While military capacities exist, both at the national level and in multinational organizations like NATO, they are aimed more towards reacting to WMD-related events in combat.  The ICRC therefore argues that the interface between such military capacities and civilian responses, be it national authorities or the ICRC, is inadequate.  Progress on civil-military co-operation and transferring knowledge and best practices into the civilian sector is very modest.  The ICRC is therefore building capacities to answer the risks of WMD-related events.  According to the organization, other challenges exist as well, such as the lack of a clear definition of assistance to civilians, the problem of asserting that an intentional use of NRBC occurred and of notifying proper authorities, such as the UN Security Council, as well as subsequent information management.[35] 69.  This section of the report highlights the significant challenges of efficient crisis response and consequence management against chemical and, in particular, biological incidents.  The Rapporteur will further analyze the associated problems as well as possible solutions and expand this section substantially in the fall version of this report. V.  CONCLUSION: SOME TENTATIVE WAYS FORWARD  70.  In December 2008, the Graham-Talent commission reported to the US Congress that “unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”[36]  Other assessments are more cautious.  Benjamin Cole of the University ofLiverpool, argues that “[t]echnological constraints coupled with tactical choices that some groups are likely to make will mean that indiscriminate mass casualty involving [chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear] weapons are likely to be rare.”[37]  Whatever the case may be, Richard Falkenrath, now Deputy Commissioner of Counter-Terrorism of the New York City Police, was right that a WMD terrorist attack represents a “low-probability, high-consequences threat.”[38]  Given the continued existence of biological and chemical programmes of certain states, it is therefore of utmost importance to work for a stronger web of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation measures, at the national and multilateral level as well as in the private sector. 71.  This draft General Report has laid out the state of the regimes governing biological and chemical weapons and hazardous agents, analyzed their weaknesses and suggested some ways forward. 72.  The dangers of chemical weapons, in the hand of extremist or states, is potentially lower, as the governing framework for chemicals that could be used in WMD is in comparatively good shape.  The CWC has been a success, as the world is well on its way to eradicate existing stockpiles of chemical weapons.  Critical issues still remain to be solved, however.  Care must be taken that chemical stockpiles in Iraq, Libya, Russia and the United States as well as leftover munitions from the wars of the 20th century are destroyed.  The CWC must be universalized, inducing hold-out states to join.  As the complete eradication of stockpiles approaches, the international community must ensure that no backsliding on treaty commitments occurs.  Other chemicals that are not explicitly governed under the CWC, such as incapacitating chemical agents, must be addressed.  Future spending levels and distribution of the OPCW must also be scrutinized to guarantee optimum efficiency. 73.  Arguably, the regime governing biological materials that could be used for malicious purposes is weaker and less engrained. Lack of trust between certain groups of states, coupled with rapid advances in science and technology and the dual-use nature of much of biotechnology, are increasingly putting a strain on the BWC.  Adding verification mechanisms to the BWC might not solve existing and future problems, given the increasing ease of evasion.  Additional confidence-building measures offer a more realistic avenue for now.  Most importantly, however, measures must be taken beyond the BWC.  Private-sector, national as well as multilateral initiatives to counter the threat from biological weapons must be developed or enhanced - for example more effective export controls and scientific code of conducts for research and development. 74.  A critical area, which has not received as much attention as it deserves, is crisis response in the case of WMD-related incidents, whether intentional or accidental.  The international community is still far from being prepared for a WMD attack.  Crisis-response mechanisms must be strengthened.  In particular, the gap between civilian and military responses needs to be filled. 75.  In conclusion, the Rapporteur wishes to engage in a debate on the proper ways forward to counter biological and chemical weapons.  One of the Science and Technology Committee’s core responsibilities is to monitor, discuss and work for more effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation measures. The Rapporteur therefore hopes that the debate on this critical subject can yield some consensus recommendations that can be put into the form of a NATO PA Resolution at the Annual Session inBucharest, Romania. [1]   Gregory D. Koblentz and Jonathan B. Tucker, “Tracing an Attack: The Promise and Pitfalls of Microbial Forensics,” Survival, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2010), p. 159. [2]   Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Second Edition (Washington, DC : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p 57-58. [3]   Emmarie Huetteman, “Smallpox Stores Stir Controversy,” United Press International, 24 August 2010 and Global Security Newswire, “Russia, US to Resist Eliminating Smallpox Strains,” Global Security Newswire, 18 January 2011. [4]   ”Western Satellites Track Libyan Mustard Agent,” Global Security Newswire, 21 March 2011. [5]   Eitan Barak, “Getting the Middle East Holdouts to Join the CWC,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2010. [6]   Report of the Committee Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), S/2008/493 (2008). [7]   Kirk Bansak, “Issues Develop as BWC Review Approaches,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2011. [8]   “US Prepares for BWC Review Conference,” Global Security Newswire, 14 December 2010. [9]   Statement of the G8 Foreign Ministers at the 7th Review Conference for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Paris, 15 March 2011, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france-priorities_1/global-economy_1116/economic-and-financial-organizations_7352/g8_7353/statement-of-the-g8-foreign-ministers-on-the-7th-review-conference-for-the-biological-and-toxin-weapons-convention_15223.html. [10]   Arms Control Association, Reducing Biological Risks to Security: International Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration (2009), http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3525. [11]   US National Security Council, National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (2009),http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/National_Strategy_for_Countering_BioThreats.pdf. [12]   “Auditors Call for US Biodefense Coordinator,” Global Security Newswire, 4 March 2011. [13]   Jonathan B. Tucker, “Is Washington Prepared to Lead at the BWC Review Conference,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2011. [14]   Robert Golan-Vilella and Daniel Horner, “NNSA Nonproliferation Spending to Rise,” Arms Control Today, March 2011.  [15]   Nuclear Threat Initiative, BW Terrorism Tutorial: Strategies for Prevention and Response, Prevention of Bioterrorism (2011),http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/bwtutorial/chapter05_01.html. [16]   Arms Control Association, Reducing Biological Risks to Security: International Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration. [17]   Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, Lyubov Nazaruk, Marc Finaud and Jenifer Mackby, Global Biosecurity: Towards A New Governance Paradigm (Geneva : Editions Slatkine, 2008), p. 200. [18]   Amy E. Smithson, “Pathogens and Arms Control: Can Bioscience Police Itself?” Survival, Vol. 52, No.5 (2010). [19]   Federation of American Scientists, Biosecurity Education Portal (2011),    http://www.fas.org/programmes/bio/educationportal.htmland Virtual Biosecurity Center, Homepage (2011),http://virtualbiosecuritycenter.org/. [20]   “Year of Transition for the OPCW,” The Hindu, 17 January 2011. [21]   E. Barak, “Getting the Middle East Holdouts to Join the CWC.” [22]   – Incapacitating Chemical Agents: Implications for International Law, Montreux, Switzerland, 24 to 26 March 2010, ICRC Expert Meeting Report (2010). [23]   Oliver Meier, “CWC Review Conference Avoids Difficult Issues,” Arms Control Today, May 2008. [24]   Oliver Meier, “CWC Review Conference Avoids Difficult Issues.” Arms Control Today, May 2008. [25]   “US Announces New Strategy for Biological Weapons Convention,” Global Security Newswire, 9 December 2009. [26]   “US Prepares for BWC Review Conference,” Global Security Newswire, 14 December 2010. [27]   Koblentz and Tucker, “Tracing an Attack: The Promise and Pitfalls of Microbial Forensics.” [28]   Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, Report Card: Government Failing to Protect America from Grave Threats of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism (2010), available from http://preventwmd.org/1_26_101/. [29]   Koblentz and Tucker, “Tracing an Attack: The Promise and Pitfalls of Microbial Forensics.” [30]   Venture Capital Dispatch, “Two Start-Ups Aim to Change Economics of Vaccine Production,” Wall Street Journal Blogs, 19 July 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2010/07/19/two-start-ups-aim-to-change-economics-of-vaccine-production/. [31]   60 Minutes, “An Inside Look at H1N1 Vaccine Production,” CBS, 1 November 2009,http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/10/29/60minutes/main5451803.shtml. [32]   John E. Calfee, “Putting Markets to Work in Vaccine Manufacturing,” AEI Health Policy Outlook,  November 2004,http://www.aei.org/outlook/21659. [33]   GlaxoSmithKline, “Pandemic Preparedness,” Public Policy Issues: GlaxoSmithKline’s Position (2009),http://www.gsk.com/policies/GSK-on-pandemic-preparedness.pdf. [34]   Loye and Coupland, “International Assistance for Victims of Use of Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical Weapons: Time for a Reality Check?,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 874 (2009), p. 329. [35]   Presentation by the ICRC in Brussels, Belgium, 9 March 2011. [36]   Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism (2008), http://preventwmd.org/report/. [37]   Benjamin Cole, The Changing face of Terrorism: How Real is the Threat from Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons? (London and New York : I.B. Tauris, 2011), p. 215. [38]   Richard Falkenrath, “Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1998), p. 44.