Lybia : The Rabta competition

SUBJECT: ITALY ON LIBYA: RABTA GATHERS STEAM 

REF: (A) ROME 1748 (B) STATE 57323 

CLASSIFIED BY: A/DCM MARGARET DEAN; REASONS 1.5 B/D, X1, X5 

¶1. (S) SUMMARY.  HAVING VETTED THE MATTER THROUGH 

INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS TO ITS SATISFACTION, THE GOI HAS 

RESUMED CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION OF AN ITALIAN 

PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY TO CONTRACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF 

LIBYA TO REFURBISH CHEMICAL FACILITIES AT RABTA TO ALLOW FOR 

THE PRODUCTION OF MEDICINES, MFA'S NONPROLIFERATION 

COORDINATOR SAID ON JUNE 14. A DRAFT ITALY-LIBYA MEMORANDUM 

OF UNDERSTANDING WILL BE INTRODUCED TO AN INTERMINISTERIAL 

DUAL USE EXPORTS COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY MFA ON JUNE 21 AND, 

THEREAFTER, ANY CHANGES TO THE RABTA CONTRACT NECESSARY TO 

COMPORT WITH THE MOU WILL BE MADE.  MFA EXPECTS THE 

APPLICATION TO BE READY FOR APPROVAL AT THE JULY MEETING OF 

THE COMMITTEE.  A BRITISH COMPANY CONTINUES TO COMPETE FOR 

THE CONTRACT AS WELL.  MFA RECENTLY HAD THE ITALIAN 

AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON VISIT THE DEPARTMENT IN ORDER TO 

REACTIVATE A DIRECT COMMUNICATION CHANNEL ON RABTA.  END 

SUMMARY. 

¶2. (S) AN ITALIAN PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY, PHARMACHIM OF 

MILAN, CONTINUES TO PUSH THE GOI FOR LEAVE TO CONTRACT WITH 

THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBYA TO REFURBISH CHEMICAL PRODUCTION 

FACILITIES AT RABTA, MFA'S NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES 

COORDINATOR UGO DE MOHR TOLD ECONOFF ON JUNE 14.  DE MOHR 

SAID ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES HAVE COMPLETED REVIEW OF 

THE CASE AND RETURNED THE FILE TO THE INTERMINISTERIAL DUAL 

                          SECRET 

PAGE 03        ROME  03067  211833Z 

USE EXPORT CONTROLS COMMITTEE HE CHAIRS.  THE APPLICATION IS 

ON THE COMMITTEE'S AGENDA FOR ITS JUNE 21 MEETING.  DE MOHR 

SAID HE WILL PRESENT AT THE MEETING A DRAFT GOI-GOL 

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING TERMS AND CONDITIONS 

FOR THE VENTURE -- TO INCLUDE REGULAR GOI INSPECTION OF 

FACILITIES AND VERIFIABLE DESTRUCTION OF "NONRELEVANT" RABTA 

FACILITIES. 

¶3. (S) DE MOHR EXPECTS THE MOU, WHEN FINALIZED WITH THE 

LIBYANS, WILL NECESSITATE CONFORMING CHANGES IN THE 

PHARMACHIM-GOL CONTRACT.  HE BELIEVES THAT, BARRING 

UNFORESEEN DELAYS, THE MOU/CONTRACT PACKAGE SHOULD BE READY 

FOR A COMMITTEE VOTE AT ITS JULY MEETING (DATE NOT YET SET). 

¶4. (S) DE MOHR SAID THE BRITISH COMPANY GLAXOSMITH CONTINUES 

TO PURSUE THE LIBYAN CONTRACT.  HE DECLINED TO REITERATE THE 

CONFIDENCE HE EXPRESSED REF A THAT PHARMACHIM HAD BEEN GIVEN 

THE INSIDE TRACK BY THE LIBYANS.  HE MENTIONED THAT AN 

UNNAMED COMPANY FROM THE BALKANS HAS ALSO RECENTLY ENTERED 

THE RABTA COMPETITION.  HE ADDED THAT ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE 

OFFICIALS HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM THEIR BRITISH 

COUNTERPARTS THAT ANY UK BLESSING OF A GOL AWARD TO 

GLAXOSMITH WOULD BE CONDITIONED ON A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT 

MOU SIMILAR TO THE ONE BEING DRAFTED BY THE GOI. 

¶5. (S) FINALLY, DE MOHR SAID THE GOI HAD RECENTLY INSTRUCTED 

ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. FERDINAND SALLEO TO VISIT THE 

DEPARTMENT TO DISCUSS RABTA.  DE MOHR'S CHARACTERIZED 

SALLEO'S VISIT AS A REACTIVATION OF A DIRECT COMMUNICATION 

CHANNEL ON THE CASE FOLLOWING ITS REVIEW BY ITALIAN 

INTELLIGENCE. 

                          SECRET 

PAGE 04        ROME  03067  211833Z 

SEMBLER 

                          SECRET LIBYA

FINDING

Libya’s disclosure regarding its CW program, its accession to the CWC, and the destruction of its unfilled CW munitions, solid precursor chemicals, and specialized CW production equipment are significant steps toward Libya coming into full compliance with its CWC obligations. By December 31, 2010, Libya had destroyed all of its Category 3 CW and met its one percent Category 1 CW destruction deadline. In February 2011, Libya retained less than 50 percent of its declared Category 1 CW and less than 60 percent of its declared Category 2 CW. Libya has not yet met its obligations under Article VII.

BACKGROUND

The Convention entered into force for Libya on February 5, 2004, and Libya made its initial declaration in March 2004. Tripoli declared a CW stockpile, CWPFs and chemical industry facilities under Article VI of the Convention.

Libya requested and received approval in January 2005 to convert the CWPFs in Pharma 150 at Rabta to purposes not prohibited by the CWC.

In February and March 2004, under the oversight of OPCW inspectors, Libya completed destruction, and activities related to destruction, of its declared Category 3 CW unfilled aerial bombs. In addition, it secured all sensitive CW materials, agents, and equipment pending their elimination under the CWC.

Libya made significant progress in the elimination of its CW stockpile and facilities during the 2004-2005 timeframe. The progress included submitting to the OPCW its detailed plan for the destruction of the mobile units that were declared as CWPFs, as well as all other spare and dismantled equipment from the Al Rabta CWPFs. Libya destroyed its solid Category 2 CW, i.e., precursor chemicals, in 2005 under the auspices of the OPCW TS. The TS also confirmed the destruction in March 2005 of Libya’s mobile units that were declared as CWPFs, and of the specialized CW production equipment.

The Libyans began the conversion of the two former CWPFs at Al Rabta in January 2005, which included the dismantling of the CW production facilities, the elimination of all declared spare and dismantled equipment under full verification measures, and inspection by the OPCW inspectors. The TS informed States Parties that Libya planned to complete the conversions by January 2008. Libya later indicated it expected to complete conversions by December 31, 2009,[4] and succeeded in accomplishing the conversions on time.

In July 2005, Libya requested U.S. assistance in destroying its remaining CW and precursor chemicals. Libyan officials told the United States that Libya’s cabinet had refused funding and desired U.S. assistance to demonstrate strong U.S.-Libyan political ties. The United States responded that it was prepared, in principle, to assist Libya in meeting its CWC obligations, provided that: (1) it was understood that Libya remains ultimately responsible for destroying its CW stockpile and meeting its treaty obligations, including approved destruction deadlines; (2) U.S. funds were available; and (3) the United States and Libya were able to conclude the necessary implementing agreements and arrangements, including liability responsibility and cost-sharing by Libya.

In December 2006, the United States and Libya signed a government-to-government contract to provide financial and technical support to design, build, and operate a chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF). Negotiations with a U.S.-designated firm to design and build a CWDF were initiated as agreed under the government-to-government contract. However, in June 2007, Libya terminated the Libya contract following a 30-day notification, citing disagreement in the negotiations with the U.S.-designated firm.

In July 2009, Libya reported the reloading of mustard, pinacolyl alcohol and isopropanol from leaking storage containers at Ruwagha. In April 2010, Libya began destruction by hydrolysis of the precursors, phosphorus trichloride and thionyl chloride, at Ruwagha with the Libyan-designed Ruwagha Hydrolysis and Neutralization System (RHNS). This was quickly halted due to technical difficulties. Libya then ordered from the Italian firm SIPSA a skid mounted hydrolysis unit that was scheduled to, but did not, start up at Ruwagha in December 2010 as the RHNS-2. SIPSA was also contracted to construct a skid mounted hydrolysis unit, RHNS-1, to meet the 1 percent and possibly the 20 percent deadlines for destruction of its Category 1 sulfur mustard stockpile. The skid unit was planned to be installed at Ruwagha and operate in the November to mid-December 2010 time frame. SIPSA was also contracted to fabricate, deliver and install equipment for the Rabta Toxic Chemical Destruction Facility (RTCDF) with delivery scheduled for December 2010, installation to be completed by January 31, 2011, and start-up to occur in March 2011, to meet the 45 and 100 percent destruction deadlines for the Category 1 stockpile. The facility would include a furnace for mustard, 2-chloroethanol and tributylamine incineration, a rotary kiln to incinerate contaminated dunnage and other combustible items, an autoclave to destroy mustard heel in polyethylene containers and a hydrolysis unit to be used for unspecified purposes. The hydrolysis unit would in part be constructed from equipment salvaged from the RNHS-2.

In light of further delays in Libya’s CW destruction program, in November 2005, CSP-10 agreed further to extend Libya’s 1, 20 and 45 percent deadlines “in principle,” with specific dates to be proposed by Libya by March 31, 2006.  EC-46 in July 2006, recommended approval of the all the dates requested by Libya. In December 2006, CSP-11 established the following dates for the intermediate Category 1 destruction deadlines: 1 percent, May 1, 2010; 20 percent, July 1, 2010. and 45 percent, November 1, 2010, and granted an extension to December 31, 2010, of the deadline for destruction of all Libya’s Category 1 CW; and called upon Libya to destroy all of its Category 2 CW no later than December 31, 2011. At the Destruction Informals prior to EC-57 in July 2009, Libya announced that it might have difficulty in achieving the 1 percent deadline of May 1, 2010, due to “environmental concerns,” and in August 2009 formally indicated that it could not meet the second set of extended deadlines.  EC-58 in October 2009, recommended extending the Libyan Category 1 intermediate destruction deadlines to: 1 percent, November 1, 2010, 20 percent, December 15, 2010, and 45 percent, January 31, 2010.   CSP-14 in December 2009, granted these intermediate Category 1 CW destruction deadlines, and amended the 100 percent deadline to May 15, 2011. In September 2010, Libya reported that due to necessary technical specification changes and to destruction facility design changes that it would need to further extend its 20 percent and 45 percent Category 1 intermediate deadlines to March 30, 2011, and April 25, 2011, respectively. These extensions were granted by CSP-15 in November 2010; the 1 percent and 100 percent deadlines established by CSP-14 remained the same.[5] Libya was reported to have destroyed one percent of its Category 1 stockpile on October 31, 2010, and achieved 22.33 percent destruction prior to December 31, 2010.[6] (U)

Compliance Discussions

Between March and December 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom had numerous exchanges with and visits to Libya to discuss the modalities of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) destruction, including Libya’s accession to the CWC. In March 2003, Libya approached the United Kingdom and United States, expressing interest in removing concerns about whether it was pursuing WMD programs. In the course of subsequent discussions and visits, the Libyans made significant disclosures about their chemical weapons programs, as well as other WMD activities. The United States and the United Kingdom conducted a number of exchanges with the Libyans, with the intention of exploring the depth and commitment of their initiative. A team of American and British experts traveled to Libya twice - in October and December 2003 - to receive detailed presentations on Libya’s nuclear, chemical and biological activities. In addition to extensive discussion during a total of three weeks of meetings, the experts were shown covert facilities and equipment and were told about years of Libyan efforts to develop chemical weapons capabilities. With regard to chemical issues, Libya showed these initial U.S.-UK teams a significant quantity of sulfur mustard chemical agent that was produced at the Pharma 150 plant at Al Rabta more than a decade previously; aerial bombs that were designed to be filled with mustard agent on short notice; equipment in storage that could be used to outfit a second CW production facility; and dual-use chemical precursors that could be used to produce mustard and nerve agent.

After Libya terminated the contract with the United States in relation to U.S. assistance for Libyan CW destruction in July 2007, the United States has held several informal discussions with Libya, on the margins of meetings of the OPCW, concerning its progress toward destruction of its CW and conversion of the Rabta CWPFs.

COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS

Libya has destroyed all of its Category 3 CW, all of its solid Category 2 CW and some of its liquid Category 2 CW precursors. It successfully met its Category 1 one percent destruction and 20 percent destruction deadlines. The OPCW TS has reported that Libya has not yet met its Article VII obligations. The TS has reported that Libya’s Article VII national implementation legislation has undergone legal review, but still has to go to the General People’s (National Assembly). The OPCW TS provided assistance with drafting Libya’s legislation. Libya has a National Authority, but has not yet enacted implementing legislation or administrative measures required under Article VII. As part of its obligations under paragraph 4 of Article X of the CWC, Libya submitted a declaration in 2005 acknowledging that it had a national protection program. Libya has not submitted any subsequent Article X declarations.