CONDOR II "critical support to Iraqi weapons programs including missiles."

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON BANKING. FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
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WASHINGTON, D.C., February 3, 1992 Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez said
today that the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee has "clear
evidence" that dozens of U.S. firms provided "critical support to Iraqi
weapons programs including missiles."
Mr. Gonzalez noted that President Bush issued a report to Congress in
September, 1991, which concluded that U.S. firms did not contribute directly
to Iraq's weapons capabilities.
In a letter to the President, the Banking Committee Chairman labeled the
report "clearly inaccurate." He called on the President to submit a new
report to Congress which would "reflect the true role played by U.S.
companies and Federal agencies in permitting the transfer of technology and
know-how to Saddam Hussein's war machine."
Mr. Gonzalez sent the President documents collected by the Committee
that showed that U.S. firms were "directly involved in the development of a
ballistic missile known as Condor II." He also cited evidence that U.S.
firms were involved in two Iraqi missile programs — under the code names
Project 144 and Project 1728 — used in the production of a modified Scud
missile.
The evidence collected by the Committee is part of an ongoing
investigation of the activities of the Italian-owned Banca Nazionale del
Lavoro that loaned two billion dollars to the Iraqi procurement network.
In his letter to the President, Mr. Gonzalez said the investigation had
oeen hampered by agencies of the Executive Branch. He said Secretary of
State James Baker has refused to transmit to the Committee information on
Craqi weapons programs despite the fact that the data has been compiled by
:he United Nations and the International Atomic Agency. He said the Treasury
department failed to fully identify the procurement network as required by
Law. The letter was also critical of the Commerce Department for granting
jxport licenses to firms supplying the Iraqi Technical Corps for Special
'rojects (TECO) which Mr. Gonzalez said was actively involved in missile
>rojects. He said the Commerce Department had full knowledge of the military
ictivities of the end user of the technology.How Iraq Built Its War Machine Through U. S. Sources
Statement of The Honorable Henry B. Gonzalez
Chairman, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
Mr. Speaker:
For over a year, the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urbar
Affairs has been investigating the activities of Banca Nazionale
del Lavoro, or BNL, in the United States. In the course of that
investigation, we have learned that BNL provided over $4 billion in
apparently illicit loans to the Government of Iraq. While about
half these loans went to purchase food commodities, it is less veil
known that about half was used to finance Iraq's efforts to build
a self-sufficient military industry— an industry that could build
missiles, one that came close to developing nuclear arms, one that
did produce chemical weapons, one that could build a super gun
capable of unprecedented range— as well as produce conventional
weapons.
X have taken this time to report, as X have promised I would,
on the Committee's activity and findings.
Last fall, ia a report to Congress, the President reported
that no U. 8. company contributed directly to Iraq's conventional
or noneonventional weapons capability. In faot, however, Iraq
operated, as extensive, clandestine procurement network that
obtained critical financing through BNL, and that operated in this
country to procure U.S. technology and know-how for Iraqi veapons
programs. X have written the President to advise him cf this
finding, and to ask that he cooperate fully in our efforts to
6 develop all the facts. Unfortunately, the Committee has met with
many obstacles in its efforts to determine how Iraq used BNL and
other sources in this country to develop important military
technology. Despite the unfortunate obstacles, we have learned a
great deal. I hope that President Bush will now order complete
cooperation as we seek to determine the full facts. I hope also
that the President will issue a report of his own, correcting the
report sent to Congress last year.
Pending further study, I do want to describe what the
committee knows about the Iraqi procurement network, how it
operated, and how U. S. firms directly participated, wittingly or
unwittingly in the Iraqi effort to develop weapons on mass
destruction.
I hope to produce a report on all the Committee's findings,
but in the meanwhile, X will provide through this forum further
information as warranted.
Already, the Committee's work on BNL has resulted in major
legislation to require more effective regulation and oversight of
foreign banks operating here. However, it is likely that more
needs to be done. X am in fact developing a new bill that would
encourage multilateral lending institutions— the World Bank
and others— to pay close attention to the need to prevent the
further proliferation of sophisticated weaponry in countries like
Iraq, that depend on those institutions for basic economic help.
Therefore, this investigative effort has important legislative
goals.
? The government of Iraq, operating with BNL financing and using
a secret procurement network, was able to obtain assistance even
through the Export-Import Bank. This network obtained $2,155
billion in loans from BNL alone, for militarily useful products—
specialized machinery, various kinds of steel, industrial
equipment, chemicals, computers, and others. In addition, BNL
financed $2 billion worth of agricultural goods through the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) program.
It was an early objective of Saddam Hussein to become an
independent producer of arms-- including nuclear weapons and the
missiles to deliver them. The world already knows that he used
chemical weapons freely against his own people. It is likely that
he would have used them in the Gulf War had he not feared
retaliation. In any case, he came close to many of his objectives-
- close to producing nuclear bombs, close to building a super gun,
and close to producing sophisticated missiles. Indeed, he did
build chemical weapons, he did build enhanced SCUD missiles, and he
did use them.
The war against Iran interrupted the indigenous Iraqi weapons
program, since the money was needed to buy finished military goods
to fight in that long and extremely bloody war. But once the war
was over/ Saddam immediately started his full scale weapons
development and production program.
The major U. 8. source of credit for food and weaponry was
BNL— a bank owned by the Italian government, which had offices in
this country, most notably in Atlanta, Georgia. A number of
persons who operated that office, and others who dealt with it,
8 have been indicted for their crimes. Some have been convicted.
But to date, the American people know little about how Iraq
operated in this country to attain its illicit goals.
Iraq could not achieve its aims without Western help. Saddam
needed more than U. 8. food. He needed technology, equipment and
supplies that were available only in the West. Despite the official
obstacles, he found little difficulty in getting what he wanted.
Structure of the Secret Network
The military procurement system of Iraq, like the rest of the
government, was tightly controlled. At the top was the Council of
Revolutionary Leadership, headed by Saddam Hussein and close family
members. This was the center of power.
Below the Council, in what we might think of as a Cabinet
department, was the Military Industrialization Board (MIB), which
planned and oversaw the effort. This Board was in all likelihood
headed by Hussain Kamil, who is Saddam's son-in-law.
Day-to-day operations of the military establishment were
carried out through the Ministry of Industry and Military
Industrialization, which X will refer to as MIMI.
MIMI in turn used a series of state-owned organizations to buy
and build the military power Saddam desired for Iraq. There were
at least a doses organizations operated by MIMI that bought Western
technology and goods for the weapons program. It was MIMI and its
affiliates that used the $2.1 billion of credit supplied by Banca
Lavoro. As a matter of fact, employees of the bank met with
Hussein Kamil on several occasions during visits to Iraq. Clearly,
this is the man who called the shots on how BNL funds were used.
9 Hussain Kamil, let it be understood, had other functions.
Besides heading the MIB and MIMI he was also head of the Secret
Service Organization (SSO). Through this organization, he set up
the clandestine technology procurement network that was essential
to Iraq's success. A key member of the Secret Service Organization
was Safa Al-Habobi, who had direct responsibility for making the
procurement scheme work. Safa Al-Habobi was the mastermind behind
MIMI's procurement efforts.
Once a year, the MIB would set goals. The MIMI would
ascertain what was needed to meet the targets, and then set out to
obtain the necessary goods.
Here is an example of how the system operated:
A military plant in Iraq known as the Martyr's Factory needed
a computer numerically controlled lathe to meet its production
goal, which required production of complex machined metal parts.
The MIB got the order from the factory and forwarded it to the
Iraqi Embassy in Germany. The Iraqi embassy in turn forwarded the
order to front companies controlled by the SSO in the United
States, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. The front companies
obtained bids, which were communicated back to the arms plant. The
plant in turs decided which, if any, bid to accept, went back up
the ladder for approval and got the goods, the delivery of which
often depended os BNL financing.
There are thousands of examples of this type of transaction.
U. 8. Assistance to Iraq's Missile Program
The MXMX used an organization knows as the Technical Corps for
10 Special Projects, or TECO, for its sophisticated missile and
nuclear development efforts. Through TECO, Iraq was able to obtain
important U. s. help in these programs, including the Condor II,
which in Iraqi code was referred to as Project 395.
The Condor II apparently started in 1984 as part of an
effort by Iraq, Egypt and Argentina to jointly develop a missile
that had a range of between 500 and 1,000 kilometers.
Argentina was to provide the development of the production
site, Iraq was to put up the financing, and Egypt was to procure
the technology. A consortium of mostly European firms handled
various portions of the project. However, by 1987 or early 1988,
Iraq became unhappy with the slow pace of the project, and
suspicious that its partners might be siphoning off some of the
billions invested. In addition, in summer 1988, Abdel Kader Helmy
was arrested in California for illegally transferring technology
for the Condor IX to Egypt. His role is more fully described in
excerpts from trial-related documents that X will include in the
record.
By the 1988, Iraq was taking a much greater role in the Condor
II project. Through TECO, which remember was a MIMI affiliate,
agreements vere sigsed with many of the original contractors who
had worked is the consortium. At that time, TECO assigned the
designation Project 395 to the Condor IX program.
Project 395 had at least three sites in Iraq, each of which
has a different function and its own project number. In addition,
an missile R&D site was erected in northern Iraq. Despite all
efforts though, the Condor apparently was not mass produced in time
11 for the invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990. However, it is clear
that much was done, and that BNL loans were vital to the program,
and that numerous Western sources, including companies from Europe
and the United States took part.
As many Members know, a Cleveland company known as Matrix
Churchill was an Iraqi front company. TECO was the controller of
that company.
To illustrate the role played by Matrix-Churchill, I offer for
the record a telex from TECO to Matrix Churchill detailing a visit
from a Baghdad delegation. The purpose of the visit was to have
TECO employees meet with over a dozen U. 8. companies that were
expected to supplv goods to the condor IX program, known also as
Project 395, but referred to for purposes of obtaining the goods as
the Badush Dam or Badush project. The date of this telex is August
6, 1988.
There was in fact a dam being constructed in the general area,
but there was also one or more missile-related facilities in the
area of the dam. It is certain that goods supposedly bought for
the dam were actually used in the missile program. The Committee
has many shipping documents that clearly show the buyer was TECO
and Project 395 was the destination.
Sample of U.S. Suppliers Involved is Project 395
Among other companies that shipped to the project were these:
Mack Truck, Pennsylvania — tractors, trucks & trailers
12 Lincoln Electric, Ohio — welding machines and supplies
Rotec Industries, Illinois — cement handling equipment
Hewlett Packard, California — computer systems
EMCO Engineering, Massachusetts — water treatment facility
IONICS, Massachusetts — water demineralization plants and
water pumping systems
Dresser Construction, Illinois, — construction equipment
Mundratech, Ltd., Illinois, -- dump trucks
Caterpillar Tractor Co., Illinois -- tractors/earth movers
Grove Manufacturing, Pennsylvania -- truck mounted cranes
Ingersoll Rand Co., New Jersey -- cement compacting machines
Liebherr-Amejica, Virginia — Liebherr cement mixers on Mack
truck chassis
Mannesmann Demag, Illinois — heavy construction equipment
The foregoing is not a complete compilation, since there are
numerous documents yet to be reviewed. However, it is an
indication of how a foreign government can use secret methods to
obtain important help for development of military projects, taking
advantage of our opes market. Project 395 is not the only one
involved. There are two other Iraq missile programs known as
Project 144 and Project 1728 that also obtained U.S. help. These
were SCUD-related programs. It was the 8CUD that was launched
against U.S. troops and numerous other targets during the Gulf War.
The Iraqi network was also responsible for obtaining
technology related to more conventional weapons such as artillery
13 shells and artillery pieces as well as nuclear weapons-related
procurement.
Administration Response Inadequate
The government has in its hands thousands of Matrix Churchill
documents, but has yet to thoroughly review them. The hard fact
is, there are not enough personnel assigned to do the job. But
these are the documents that show clearly what the Iraqi network
was and how it operated, as well the importance of the BNL
financial support. Today, there is no higher priority than to
prevent the spread of sophisticated weapons to countries like Iraq-
- and yet, there £s not an adequate effort even to determine what
went wrong in the case of Iraq, so that the lessons can be applied.
There are hundreds of cases in which the exports to Iraq
required U.S. export licenses. Export licensing documents show
that the end user was often times an establishment engaged in
military activity. Nevertheless, it is clear that Iraq had little
trouble in getting the licenses from the Department of Commerce.
Moreover, in the case of TECO, this occurred despite the fact that
the Departments of Commerce and State had clear knowledge of what
TECO vas and what its purposes were. It is painfully clear that
the export licensing system did little or nothing to prevent Iraq
from getting the goods it needed for its weapons program— even
though the State and Commerce Departments were adequately informed
of the real nature of the buyer.
14 Misleading Report
The Iraq Sanctions Act required the President to submit a
report to the Congress on the sale, export and third party transfer
of nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile technology
to or with Iraq. The report submitted to the Congress is classed
as "secret". However, there is little information in the report
that is not already published and in the public realm. But the
significant fact is that the report was at the very least
misleading in its conclusion that U. S. companies were not directly
involved supplying Iraqi conventional and nonconventional weapons
capability. Thiss^is not only my opinion; the United Nations has»
reached the same conclusion.
Pursuant to Resolution 687, the United Nations mandates the
"destruction, removal or rendering harmless" Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction. This would include any missiles with a range of more
than 150 kilometers, missile components and support facilities -
for example the enhanced SCUD and the Condor IX. This task is
assigned to the a United Nations Special Commission and the
International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, which as the world
knows has encountered harassment and obstruction from Iraq.
Despite this, the UN has obtained information that confirms the
Committee's own findings about the procurement system and how U. s.
firms were used.
The Committee has asked for the relevant U.N. documents, but
these are available only through the request of the State
Department, strangely enough, the Administration has bees slow to
is ask for the information. Last November 13th, I asked Secretary
Baker to obtain the documents and provide them to the Committee.
Thus far the Secretary has not responded— has not made the request
and has not explained why there has been no action on the part of
he Administration. I include the November 13 letter in the Record.
It is unacceptable that the Administration will not obtain
information that it needs to support its own policy. Neither has
it assigned the personnel required to thoroughly evaluate its own
documents concerning Iraq's weapons program and how it worked.
we know that Saddam Hussein came close to meeting his goals.
We know that other nations are no doubt engaged in the same kind of
activity, and that they must utilize sources of technology that are
available only in this country. And yet, there is no apparent
aggressive effort underway to learn the lessons that the Iraq
episode offers, and to take the steps necessary to see that it does
not happen again.
The documents X am submitting are a fair start toward
necessary understanding. There is far more to be told. But today,
X simply want my colleagues to know how Iraq worked, and to
understand that the Administration has only a poor understanding of
the facts, and that the Administration is doing little either to
learn how to correct its mistakes or to ask the UN to provide the
knowledge, that it has developed.
In later reports, X will discuss other aspects of the Iraqi
program, what our government knew, and how it responded. But for
today, these are the essential facts:
16 1. Iraq determined early in Saddam Hussein's rule to become
independent of Russian and Western sources for sophisticated
weapons;
2. Iraq developed a carefully controlled system to develop
and build chemical and nuclear weapons, and to build missiles
capable of delivering those weapons;
3. Iraq used a clandestine procurement network in its
efforts;
4. Iraq controlled companies in this country that supplied
important support to the weapons program;
5. Iraq used U.S. companies in that effort;
6. The Commerce Department, with the acquiescence of other
agencies, readily licensed the export of militarily useful goods to
Iraq, even though it clearly knew or should have known what the
real purpose was;
7. The President submitted an inaccurate report to the
Congress concerning these matters; and
8. The State Department has thus far refused to obtain
relevant information from the UN on the Iraqi weapons program, and
moreover, like other agencies, seems to put a low priority on
learning from this episod

Operation Condor

Operación Cóndor en el Archivo del Terror The origin of the transaction must be sought in an alleged encounter , which took place in February 1974 , including some prominent elements of the secret police of Chile , Bolivia, Argentina , Uruguay and Paraguay with Manuel Contreras , chief of DINA ( Pinochet's secret services ) , in Santiago, Chile , but it was during the tenth conference of the American armies of 3 September 1973 the Brazilian General Breno Borges Fortes proposed to extend the partnership and collaboration between the various intelligence agencies to combat communism and subversive about every [ 5] . This deadly alliance between dictatorships was sponsored by the United States , but many think it was directly ordered by the government of Washington . The transaction was facilitated through a series of coups between the fifties and seventies: The General Alfredo Stroessner came to power in Paraguay in 1954. The Brazilian armed forces overthrew the democratic government of João Goulart in 1964. The General Hugo Banzer takes power in Bolivia in 1971 after a series of coups . Forces loyal to General Augusto Pinochet besiege the presidential palace in Chile in 1973 , overthrew the democratic government of Salvador Allende. A military junta , led by General Jorge Rafael Videla comes to power in Argentina in 1976. Objectives of the operation of repression [edit | edit source ] The official objectives of the repressions of the intelligence services were cooperating leftist guerrillas who operated in a rather bland against dictatorships (such as the Montoneros Argentine or Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left ) , but in fact was oriented and magistrate was vented against all manner of opposition political, social and human . Were kidnapped , tortured and killed unarmed students , journalists, intellectuals , university professors (especially the humanities ) , trade unionists , workers, mothers and fathers who were seeking their missing children , and often the violence was not limited to a single subject deemed " subversive " , but also extended to the family of this [6] . The supports dictatorships [edit | edit source ] Dictatorships are part of Operation Condor fruirono of the massive U.S. aid , in terms of economic resources , training, and military supplies , and preparation and organization of Intelligence . It also supported the extreme right , which in all cases helped bring them to power, and in times of crisis organized themselves into armed squads ( death squads ) [7] , to assassinate political opponents and leftists . Among the most notorious organizations of repressive right there were the Triple A Argentine and Chilean organization Patria y Libertad , both funded by the CIA The coordinations [edit | edit source ] In the area of ​​the Panama Canal C.I.A. had set up a base for coordination and communication and used for the transit of materials, media , men, and the exchange of intelligence information between the various secret services of the states cooperating in the operation. Communications ( usually performed by telex ) were mopping floors , torture techniques to be used , methods for the removal of prisoners ( such as flights of death theorized in Argentina by Luis Maria Mendia and then put into practice by the end of the seventies ) , and information about clandestine subversive organizations . The Coordinating Committee revolutionary ( " Revolutionary Junta de Coordinación " ) [edit | edit source ] Meanwhile, at the end of 1974 , the organizations of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR , Chile ) , the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP , Argentina ) , the Tupamaros (Uruguay) , and the National Liberation Army (Bolivia) (ELN ) in turn had formed the " Revolutionary Junta de Coordinación ( JCR ) ." Towards 1976, after numerous defeats tactics, the JCR had formed an international structure to protect themselves from the actions of Operation Condor abroad. This task was carried out by the militants of these organizations abroad , most beleaguered Europe. The discovery of the Archives of Terror [edit | edit source ] Main article: For more, see Archives of terror. In 1992 , the national Paraguayan José Agustín Fernández discover, during an investigation into a police station in Asunción , detailed records describing the fate of thousands of South Americans secretly kidnapped, tortured and murdered between the seventies and eighties by the armed forces and services secrets of Chile , Argentina, Uruguay , Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil. The archives counted 50,000 people killed , 30,000 disappeared ( desaparecidos ) and 400,000 incarcerated . These archives , which are considered accurate and reliable , reported involvement in this huge crackdown and real extermination , even the secret services of Colombia , Peru and Venezuela. These documents , for the heinous revelations contained in them, were called Archives of Terror . States involved [edit | edit source ] This operation involved in the first place , the CIA , the U.S. Secret Service , as well as military equipment , far-right organizations , political parties and anti- guerrilla movements in South America . All of these organizations were used as a tool , in many states, to overthrow democratically elected governments as well as that of Salvador Allende in Chile Were allocated substantial sums to complete this massive political level, because the financial stakes were high , given the wealth, especially of raw materials , of South America. The C.I.A. provided always support , coverage , support and money to the intelligence coup in South America , as well as training at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation , and also in the United States . France [change | change source ] The French journalist Marie -Monique Robin discovered in the archives of the French Foreign Ministry ( Quai d' Orsay) original documents that demonstrate the implementation of a plan to create a base of operations in Argentina, the French military , according to which the French officers , experts in counterinsurgency and counterinsurgency , the Argentine military trained in techniques of torture and abduction of dissidents and political opponents . [8] The French officers were all veterans of the Algerian War , and practically trained in such matters. The collaboration went on , the seventies, until 1981 , the year he was elected president of the Socialist François Mitterrand. During the Battle of Algiers, the Algerian disappeared about 30,000 in the same manner with which disappeared the disappeared in Latin America in the seventies. During the War of 1957 in fact, the French paratroopers of Colonel Marcel Bigeard began to develop techniques that would have been passed on to the Argentine military , even during classes at the École Militaire , where many South American officers were trained and trained. In addition , Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, French president , had , during those years, secret relations with Pinochet's Chile and Argentina of the military juntas . [Citation needed] He gave them money , men for training , logistical support and intelligence . [citation needed] United States of America [change | change source ] Henry Kissinger The United States is fully responsible for the onset of dictatorships in Latin America in those years. Any prospect of change in South American countries , with a view to a better balance and social justice, undermined the interests of many U.S. companies . Communism was feared, given that the investment Americans could be shaken as a result of the emancipation of the working classes and peasants . Among the biggest promoters of Operation Condor , there were the secretary of state Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon. The U.S. political - economic doctrine [edit | edit source ] The U.S.A. settled large amounts of capital to secure certain economic security , and " invested in dictatorships ," make sure you get a fat profit. The military regimes were dismantling the welfare state , abolished unions and pensions , thus ensuring even higher profits to foreign companies , which imposed rhythms and working conditions to the workers and peasants. The foreign companies forced , by the military governments their " vassals " , mainly to trade with them. Sometimes - the smaller countries - imposed monoculture . But more often the big companies resold to South American countries - at a higher price - the goods that they themselves produce . Secret Service involved and / or implicated [edit | edit source ] C.I.A. , U.S. Secret Service DISIP , the Venezuelan intelligence service SIDE, the Argentine intelligence services DINA , the Chilean secret service Anti-Communist Alianza Argentina , Argentine paramilitary organization Alianza American Anti-Communist , Colombian paramilitary organization Characters [edit | edit source ] Richard Nixon Michael Townley Stephen Chiaia Manuel Contreras Klaus Barbie Henry Kissinger Luis Posada Carriles Implementation in various states [edit | edit source ] Argentina [edit | edit source ] The Dirty War in Argentina, the military junta called National Reorganization Process ( Proceso de Reorganización Nacional ), was implemented in conjunction with Operation Condor. Between 1976 and 1983 more than 30,000 people were murdered by the armed forces and by the executioners of the dictatorship . [9] The SIDE ( Argentine intelligence ) gave support to the Bolivian general Luis García Meza Tejada during the coup that put him at the head of the state. The operating unit Batallón de Inteligencia 601 Argentine intelligence actively participated in the coup , in collaboration with paramilitary troops recruited by the Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie ( Gestapo officer nicknamed the Butcher of Lyon, who took refuge in south america) , and the neo-fascist Italian Stefano Chiaia ( terrorist refugee who enjoyed the protection of the Italian and American secret services ) . Brazil [edit | edit source ] Already since 1964 the Brazilian military regimes did their utmost with extreme hardness and violence to repress and suppress guerrilla movements of the left, much more active than in Chile or Argentina . Giancarlo Capaldo - An Italian public prosecutor - who was investigating some cases of disappearance of Italian citizens (probably kidnapped and killed by the combined forces of Argentina, Chilean , Paraguayan and Brazilian ) , 11 Brazilian military accused of being involved in such crimes. [10] Chile [edit | edit source ] Pinochet's Chile , immediately after the coup, arrived Brazilian military "experts" in the techniques of torture , kidnapping and imprisonment of opponents and the dismantling of organizations declared illegal . The Chilean intelligence services were able , thanks to the organization of Operation Condor , assassinating many people uncomfortable to the regime abroad, such as Orlando Letelier [10] [ 11] . Pinochet, who also enjoyed the aid of the neo-fascist Stephen Chiaia [10] and the United States , which commissioned the coup of 1973, which came to power . [12] Bombings and assassinations International [edit | edit source ] General Carlos Prats [edit | edit source ] General Carlos Prats and his wife were assassinated by the Chilean DINA September 30, 1974 , a car bomb in Buenos Aires, where he lived in exile. Pinochet and the direction of the DINA , in the person of Manuel Contreras , were found guilty of this murder, as admitted by Contreras . The Chilean Enrique Arancibia Clavel secret agent has been jailed in Argentina for this murder. Bernardo Leighton [edit | edit source ] Bernardo Leighton, a Democrat politician went into exile in Italy after the coup of Pinochet, was seriously wounded during an attack on his person, October 5, 1976 in Rome. A survey has revealed that the secret agent Michael Townley , as a delegate of the DINA , he met in 1975 in Madrid , the terrorist Stephen Chiaia and Virgilio Paz Romero, to organize the murder of Leighton, protected by the secret police Franco . Orlando Letelier [edit | edit source ] Orlando Letelier , minister of the government of Salvador Allende overthrown by the coup, was assassinated by a car bomb September 21, 1976 , while he was in exile in Washington. Once again, the responsibility has been identified in the DINA , in close collaboration with the CIA In an open letter appeared in the Los Angeles Times December 17, 2004 , the son of Orlando Letelier , Francisco , wrote that the murder of his father was attributable to Operation Condor , or to " an intelligence network used by six South American dictators of ' era to eliminate dissidents . " Five days before the assassination of Letelier , Henry Kissinger had quashed a statement from the U.S. Department of State, ambassadors wondered where the governments of South American countries to cease with the political killings . According to Kissinger, this document has been distorted by NARA , because he wanted to give the U.S. ambassador in Uruguay, another way to put pressure on the government of Montevideo , as he feared for his own life . [13] Other tasks and projects related to Operation Condor [edit | edit source ] Caravans of death operation Colombo Continúan surgiendo pruebas de la coordinación represiva de los militares en el Cono Sur usadas en las cortes desde Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay hasta España, Francia, Italia y Estados Unidos National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 239 - Part II

Washington D.C., Diciembre 21, 2007 –En ocasión del 15 aniversario del descubrimiento del Archivo del Terror en Paraguay, el National Security Archive publica nuevas pruebas de la coordinación de las dictaduras del Cono Sur en desapariciones en los años 1970y 1980,  junto a otras conocidas que hicieron famoso a este acervo. La selección de documentos incluye evidencias  inéditas de la detención de Horacio Campiglia y Elcira Campiglia (ambos desaparecidos), por fuerzas de seguridad argentina y transcripción de los cuestionarios preparados por el Coronel de la inteligencia argentina, Jose Osvaldo Riveiro, para el interrogatorio del chileno Jorge Isaac Fuentes Alarcón y el argentino Amilcar Santucho, detenidos en Paraguay en 1975. La cooperación entre Argentina, Chile y Paraguay en el caso Santucho – Fuentes Alarcón,  las cartas del jefe de inteligencia Chileno Manuel Contreras a su par Paraguayo Pastor Coronel, y el programa  de la primera reunión de Operación Cóndor en 1975, la comunicación regular entre Cóndor 1 y Cóndor 4 en 1976,  las sesiones conjuntas entre el D-2 de inteligencia paraguayo, el Servicio de Inteligencia del Estado (SIDE) de Argentina y el Servicio de Inteligencia de Defensa (SID) del Uruguay en 1977 y las pesquisas para capturar Montoneros en Asunción, Paraguay por oficiales de la Escuela Mecanica de la Armada en 1980, dan una muestra de las múltiples facetas de la coordinación represiva entre las dictaduras de la época. Por años, el Archivo del Terror ha servido y sirve como fuente de evidencia ante cortes internacionales gracias en gran parte el tenaz trabajo de investigadores paraguayos como Alfredo Boccia Paz, Rosa Palau y Miriam Gonzalez. En su libro “Es mi informe: los archivos secretos de la policía de Stroessner (Asunción : CDE, 1994)” salieron a la luz los mas conocidos documentos de este acervo único. Entre ellos, otro que se publica hoy, esta la nota manuscrita en que la desaparecida Dora Marta Landi, una ciudadana argentina detenida junto a dos argentinos y dos uruguayos, clama por su libertad al a policía paraguaya. Hoy, con la colaboración del National Security Archive, la digitalización del acervo completo en el Archivo del Terror Digital (ATD), permite encontrar nuevas evidencias del terrorismo de estado en el Cono Sur en los años 1970 y 1980.   Junio 7, 1975 - Nomina de Detenidos en el Departamento Investigaciones (Fotograma 00019F 0510-0514) [Inédito. Publicado por primera vez Aquí] A pocos días de su captura,  el Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía de Asunción empieza a caer en cuenta que dos sospechosos son mucho más que simples viajeros. En la segunda de este informe de 5 páginas, y bajo la categoría de “Grupo averiguaciones”, se lee el detalle de los capturados números 15 y 16: “Amílcar Latino Santucho Juárez, argentino… Detenido el 16-V-75… por hallarse en su poder diario de tendencia izquierdista argentina… Se presentó a las autoridades con el supuesto nombre de Juan Manuel Montenegro.” “Jorge Isaac Fuentes Alarcón o Ariel Nodarse Ledesma, chileno… Detenido el 17-V-75… por acompañar durante el viaje a Amílcar  Latino Santucho Juárez.”  Santucho, hermano del líder del Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) de  Argentina, permanecerá prisionero en Paraguay por largos años, y Fuentes Alarcón, alto dirigente del movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) de Chile, desaparecería a manos de la Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA). [Circa Julio 1975] – Alicia(Fotograma 000080F 0719-0720) [Circa Julio 1975] - Cuestionario para Nene (Fotograma 000080F 0721-0722) [Inéditos. Publicados por primera vez Aquí] Advertidos los organismos de inteligencia del Cono Sur, comienzan a participar de los interrogatorios en Paraguay de Santucho y Fuentes Alarcón. En estos dos documentos, el agente de inteligencia Argentino Jose Osvaldo Ribeiro [Alias Rawson] desarrolla una serie de preguntas para el interrogatorio en Paraguay de Santucho (alias Alicia) y Fuentes Alarcón (alias Nene) dirigidas a esclarecer las actividades y fuerza de la Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria (JCR), una coalición de las fuerzas guerrilleras MIR de Chile, ERP de Argentina, MLN-Tupamaros de Uruguay y ELN de Bolivia, formada recientemente. El agente de inteligencia requiere que Santucho “Señale el motivo de su viaje… Pero sin cuento – Hasta ahora mintió siempre y dilato la investigación… Puesto que desempeña en la JCR” En tanto que el Nene  debe informar en primer lugar, entre otros, “Desde cuando conoce a Patricio Antonio Biedma… Que funciones tiene Biedma en la JCR.” El Chileno Patricio Biedma desaparecería en 1976 en el nefasto centro clandestino de detención de Operación Cóndor, Automotores Orletti, en Buenos Aires. Agosto 28, 1975 Remitir Obsequio y Fotografías  (Fotograma 00021F 1560) [Publicado previamente por varias fuentes] El Jefe del Segundo Departamento [Inteligencia] del Estado Mayor General del Ejército de Paraguay, Benito Guanes Serrano, remite al Jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones “Un paquete obsequio del Jefe II Icia. del EMGE [Inteligencia del Estado Mayor General del Ejercito] Argentino, General de Brigada Otto Carlos Paladino.”  Seguramente en agradecimiento por la captura  de Santucho y Fuentes Alarcón, Paladino envía además “fotografías de Illich Ramírez Sanchez (Carlos)” que serian usadas en el interrogatorio de los prisioneros. Un año más tarde, el General  Paladino ocuparía  el cargo de Jefe del Servicio de Inteligencia del Estado SIDE, a cargo del centro clandestino de detención Automotores Orletti, en Buenos Aires. Septiembre 25, 1975 - [Agradecimiento del Jefe de Inteligencia de Chile] (PDF en color) (Fotograma 00022F 0152) [Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”] A dos días que Fuentes Alarcón fuera entregado a la inteligencia Chilena y llevado al centro clandestino de detención de Villa Grimaldi en Santiago, Chile, en una nota con membrete oficial “Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, Coronel, Director de Inteligencia Nacional [DINA] saluda muy atentamente al Sr. Jefe de Investigaciones del Paraguay, Don Pastor Coronel  y… le hace llegar los más sinceros agradecimientos por la cooperación prestada para facilitar las gestiones relativas a la misión que debió cumplir mi personal en la hermana República del Paraguay.” El Jefe de la inteligencia Chilena termina su nota asegurando que “esta mutua cooperación continuara siempre creciente para el logro de los objetivos comunes coincidentes de ambos servicios.” Octubre 1975 - [invitación del Jefe de Inteligencia de Chile] (PDF en color) (Fotograma 00022F 0153) [Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”] La colaboración entre los servicios de inteligencia del Cono Sur en 1975, sentó las bases para lo que sería la semilla de Operación Cóndor que se inauguraría en Santiago de Chile en noviembre de ese año. En esta nota, “Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, Coronel, Director de Inteligencia Nacional saluda atentamente al Sr. General de División Don Francisco Brites, Jefe de la Policía de la República del Paraguay, y tiene el alto honor de invitarle a una Reunión de Trabajo de Inteligencia Nacional que se realizara en Santiago de Chile, entre los días 25 de Noviembre y 01 de Diciembre de 1975. La reunión tiene  carácter de Estrictamente Secreta, y se adjunta Temario propuesto…” Octubre 1975 - Primera Reunión de Trabajo de Inteligencia Nacional (PDF en color)  (Fotograma 00022F 0155-0165) [Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”] Acompañando a la invitación de Contreras, en  once paginas iba el programa de trabajo y concepción del la primera reunión de lo que se conoce fue Operación Cóndor. El programa de discusiones en que participarían militares de Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Brasil, Paraguay y Uruguay, buscaba establecer  “Una coordinación eficaz que permita un intercambio oportuno  de informaciones y experiencias…” . Según el análisis del documento,“La subversión ha desarrollado Mandos intercontinentales, Continentales, Regionales y Subregionales, centralizados para coordinar las acciones disociadoras. A manera de ejemplo… La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria para el sur, etc.” En tanto que los países del Cono Sur “están combatiendo solos o cuando mas con entendimientos bilaterales o simples acuerdos de caballeros…” El “Sistema de Coordinación y Seguridad” propuesto por los chilenos, contaría con un  Banco de Datos y una  Central de Informaciones  con  transmisores de telex, y contemplaba “Reuniones de Trabajo” regulares entre las fuerzas de seguridad del Cono Sur.  Pero, tomando en cuenta seguramente imprevistos como la captura de Fuentes Alarcón y Santucho en Paraguay, “deben estimularse Reuniones de trabajo bilaterales o extraordinarias cuando la situación asi lo exija.”   Abril 4, 1976 - [De cóndor 1 a cóndor 4] (PDF en color)  (Fotograma 00132 F 2129) [Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”] El Ministerio del Interior de Paraguay recibió este cable que transmite un mensaje urgente de Cóndor 1 [DINA chilena] a  Cóndor 4 [Inteligencia del Paraguay] respecto de la captura de un estudiante paraguayo en Corrientes, Argentina. En el Archivo del Terror se encuentran varios cables como este que muestran que para 1976, una vez regularizado el sistema de comunicaciones de Operación Cóndor, sus participantes intercambiarían cables con identificativos Cóndor. Como lo señala el investigador John Dinges, la distribución de apelativos entre los aparatos de inteligencia era: Cóndor uno (Chile), Cóndor dos (Argentina), Cóndor tres (Uruguay), Cóndor cuatro (Paraguay), y  Cóndor cinco (Bolivia). Al jugar Chile el papel de reunión central de informaciones de la Operación Cóndor, este recibiría la información de un país para transmitirla a otro pertinente. Julio 6, 1976  Pedido de Búsqueda No 23-76  (Fotograma 00021F 1522) [Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”] El Jefe del Segundo Departamento [Inteligencia] del Estado Mayor General del Ejército de Paraguay, Benito Guanes Serrano, emite un pedido de búsqueda dirigido entre otros a Cóndor 1 y al SIE (Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército, Argentina) a fin de informarse sobre un movimiento guerrillero en Paraguay que habría sido detectado por la inteligencia Argentina Marzo 29, 1979 -  Dora Marta Landi Gil(PDF en color)  (Fotograma 00017F 1317-1319) [Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”] Luego de su captura por el Departamento de Investigaciones en marzo de de 1977 en Asunción, quedó fichada  la ciudadana argentina Dora Marta Landi Gil.  Dora Marta fue capturada con  su novio  Alejandro José Logoluso Di Martino, y  José Nell, todos argentinos, junto a los uruguayos  Nelson Rodolfo Santana Scotto  y Gustavo Edison Inzaurralde. Los cinco habían viajado a Paraguay escapando de la represión en Argentina, y a partir de esta fecha desaparecerían. Tal como lo dice la ficha de Dora Marta, no fue hasta que saliera a luz el Archivo del Terror que se conocería  que su verdadero destino fue resultado de la coordinación represiva entre las fuerzas de seguridad uruguayas, argentinas y paraguayas.: “De orden Superior, el 16 de Mayo de 1977 [viajaron] a Buenos Aires R.A…. quedando los mismos a disposición de las Autoridades Argentinas.” Abril 5-6, 1977 -  Resumen de Actividades de Inteligencia(Fotograma 00152F 0763-0767) [Publicado previamente por varias fuentes] La Dirección de Investigaciones organiza  una sesión de dos días de interrogatorios conjuntos a los cinco capturados en los que se encuentran “presentes en la oportunidad personal del Servicio de Inteligencia de la República Uruguay” y en “el segundo día de actividad en esta se constituyeron personal perteneciente a la SIDE [Servicio de Inteligencia del Estado de Argentina]… facilitando ampliamente las actividades de trabajo.” Como bien lo señalaran los investigadores paraguayos en su libro “Es mi Informe”, además de establecer los lazos con organizaciones guerrilleras uruguayas y argentinas de los detenidos, el resumen de Inteligencia informa remarcablemente que Dora Marta Landi Gil “no posee ningún tipo de militancia” y que se “encontraría desvinculada a las anteriores actividades de su concubino.” Abril 9, 1977 - Elevar Informe(Fotograma 00172F 0570) [Publicado previamente por varias fuentes] El Director de Política y Afines, Alberto Cantero, informa a su superior, el Jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones, Pastor Coronel, sobre los interrogatorios a los cinco desaparecidos  haciendo un “resumen de las actividades del equipo de trabajo que se constituyo los días 5, 6, y 7 de los corrientes, integrado por el Coronel Benito Guanes [Jefe del Departamento II de  inteligencia militar], y el Teniente Coronel Galo Escobar del II Departamento del Estado Mayor General [de Paraguay]; Teniente 1º  Angel Spada y Sargento Juan Carlos Camicha, de la Jefatura del Área 234 [Argentina]; Jose Montenegro y Alejandro Stada del SIDE, ambos de la República Argentina y el Mayor Carlos Calcagno del Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército del Uruguay.” Mayo 1977 - [Nota  de Dora Marta Landi]  (Fotograma 00188F 1784] [Publicado originalmente en “Es mi Informe”] Esta desgarradora nota manuscrita de Dora Marta Landi días antes de desaparecer descubierta por los investigadores paraguayos, fue dirigida presumiblemente al Director Alberto Cantero. En ella Dora Marta escribe: “Sr. Director, Al hablar con usted olvide decirle lo siguiente. Creo que a ustedes puede servirles de algo para aclarar el problema de los documentos, hablar con los padres de mi marido. Creo que para eso ha de bastar con que nos permitan; ya sea por teléfono o por una esquela pedirles que se presenten aquí. Pienso que si todavía no la han hecho, ha de ser tal vez porque no sepan que estamos aquí… Le agradezco inmensamente que me haya escuchado y le pido que disculpe mi insistencia.” Ella desaparecería pocos días más tarde. En vano la buscarían en los años venideros sus familiares. Mayo 16, 1977 -  Elevar Informe  (Fotograma 00172F 0398) [Publicado previamete por varias fuentes] Pastor Coronel informa a Cantero que “En el día de la fecha, siendo las 16:34 horas, en un avión Bi-reactor de la Armada Argentina, con matricula 5-7-30 – 0653, piloteado por el Capitán de Corbeta Jose Abdala, viajaron con destino a la ciudad de Buenos Aires (República Argentina), los siguientes detenidos: Gustavo Edison Inzaurralde (Uruguayo), Nelson Rodolfo Santana Scotto (uruguayo),  Jose Nell (argentino), Alejandro Jose Logoluso (argentino) y Dora Marta Landi Gil (argentina). Las mencionadas personas fueron entregadas por conducto de esta Dirección, en presencia del Coronel don Benito Guanes y del Capitán de Fragata Lázaro Sosa, al Teniente 1º Jose Montenegro y Juan Manuel Berret, ambos del SIDE [Argentina].” Julio 10, 1980 – Ingreso de Terroristas Argentinos a Su País a Través del Nuestro (Fotograma 00019F 0876) [Inédito. Publicado por primera vez Aquí] El Jefe del Estado Mayor General  y el Jefe del Departamento 2 (D-2 inteligencia) del Ejercito de Paraguay informan que “Hemos recibido la visita del Teniente de Navío Orlando Ruiz, de la Escuela Mecánica de la Armada (ARG)… con quienes mantenemos intercambio de informaciones… Nos informó que han capturado a dos integrantes del T.E.I. (Tropas Especiales de Infantería) del grupo terrorista Montoneros”. Desde principios de 1980, la inteligencia argentina había tenido varios éxitos coordinando con la inteligencia Brasileña la captura clandestina de guerrilleros Montoneros del T.E.I. que estaban infiltrando Argentina en lo que se conoce como la Contra Ofensiva de Montoneros. En esta ocasión, los argentinos buscaban a una pareja desconocida de Montoneros en Asunción y “Solicitaron venir a nuestro país con uno de los detenidos a efectos de identificar a esa pareja… y coordinar con autoridades nuestras la operación de identificación, seguimiento y si fuese necesario el caso detención de esta pareja.” Septiembre 1980 - Ampliando Antecedentes Remitidos Informo (Fotograma 00019F 0052-0054) [Inédito. Publicado por primera vez Aquí] En este remarcable documento se descubre evidencia que dos ciudadanos argentinos desaparecidos, Horacio Campiglia y Elcira Campiglia,  fueron efectivamente detenidos por las fuerzas de seguridad Argentina. El Telex de rutina, enviado por una agencia de inteligencia argentina desconocida, probablemente la Policía Federal, informa sobre varios sospechosos argentinos que podrían haber estado implicados en el reciente asesinato en Asunción del depuesto dictador nicaragüense Anastasio Somoza. Luego de listar antecedentes sobre Mercedes Hodgers,  Hugo Alfredo Irurzún y Jorge Alberto Ruiz, el cable da detalles sobre Jorge Omar Lewinger, incluyendo que su “Ultimo  encuadre conocido: MAY80: Jefe de Departamento América… Por debajo de NG Petrus (Detenido)… Estuvo juntado con Alcira Campiglia (Detenida)”. Horacio Campiglia (Alias Petrus) desapareció a principios de 1980. No es hasta 2002 que documentación desclasificada de los Estados Unidos confirmara que fue capturado por un escuadrón Argentino en Rio de Janeiro y llevado a centro clandestino de detención de Campo de Mayo [ver Documento 10: Conversación con fuente de inteligencia  argentina, 7 de Abril de 1980]. Por su parte, su hermana, Elcira Campiglia, se sabe desapareció en 1977. Aunque sus restos han sido identificados y recuperados, no existía hasta ahora documentación sobre la implicación de las fuerzas de seguridad.

Known Iraqi uranium holdings have been accounted for by the Coalition and the IAEA.

Srive Nebbia nell'editoriale di Ecologia politica 1996b che tra le nuove fonti energetiche il ciclo nucleare è l'unico che consente di ottenere cose commercialmente utili, si tratta di elettricità o di bombe atomiche, per la nostra generazione ad un costo che sarà pagato per decenni o secoli, in futuro da chi non ci ha chiesto nessun parere. Il ciclo nucleare è una prima invenzione tecnica che pone un problema di responsabilità morale estesa nel futuro. 

Known Iraqi uranium holdings have been accounted for by the Coalition and the IAEA. In June 2004, a joint IAEA and Coalition team verified the inventory of Iraqi uranium compounds—an inventory comprising both imported material and that indigenously produced prior to 1991.

• During the 1970s and early 1980s, Iraq bought uranium in various forms from the international market. These materials included about 486 tons of yellowcake, 33,470 kg of “natural” uranium dioxide, 1,767 kg of “low-enriched” uranium dioxide (2.6 percent 235U), and 6,005 kg of “depleted” uranium dioxide from Portugal, Italy, Niger, and Brazil. 

Prior to 1991, Iraq also acquired highly enriched uranium for its research reactors from France and Russia—material that was removed from Iraq following the 1991 Gulf war. Following the Husayn Kamil defection in 1995, Iraq admitted that in 1991 it had intended to use this highly enriched fuel as part of a “crash program” to develop a nuclear weapon (see Table 1).

Table 1  Declared Iraqi International Uranium Purchases
Country	Organization/  Company	Time-frame	Uranium Form	Amount	Comment
Portugal	Emprese National de uranio EP	20 Jun 1980	“Yellowcake”	138.098 tons (uranium content approximately 103 tons)	IAEA notified through “ICR” report (29 Jun 80) (not subject to safeguards according to INFCIRC/153 corrected.)
		17 May 1982	“Yellowcake”	148.348 tons (uranium content approximately 110 tons)	No IAEA notification (not subject to safeguards according to INFCIRC/153 corrected.)
		31 May 1982
		20 Jun 1982
Italy	SNIA-TECHINT through CNEN	12 Dec 1979	“Depleted” uranium dioxide	6,005 kg	Under IAEA safeguards
		12 Dec 1979	“Natural” uranium dioxide	4,006 kg
		12 Dec 1979	“Natural” uranium dioxide(pellets & fuel rods)	500 kg
		18 May 1982	“Low-Enriched” uranium dioxide (2.6% 235U)	1,767 kg
Niger	ONAREM (Office National Des Resources Minieres)	08 Feb 1981	“Yellowcake”	(uranium content 199.9 tons)	IAEA notified (not subject to safeguards according to INFCIRC/153 corrected.)
		18 Mar 1981			No IAEA notification (not subject to safeguards according to INFCIRC/153 corrected.)
Brazil	Through CNEN (Commisao Nacional de Energia Nuclear)	Sep 1981	“Natural” uranium dioxide	7,964 kg	No IAEA notification

Acquiring a Safeguarded Fuel Cycle

Since its inception in the early 1970s, Iraq's nuclear weapons program has depended on deception and determination. Originally, the plan, which one of us (Hamza) authored, was to acquire a complete nuclear fuel cycle able to produce and separate plutonium. The plan focused on the foreign acquisition of complete nuclear facilities with training in their use conducted in the supplier country.

During the 1970s, Iraq concentrated on acquiring nuclear facilities overseas that would have been under IAEA safeguards, since Iraq had signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Nonetheless, Iraq reckoned it could defeat the safeguards at these facilities or secretly build undeclared duplicate facilities.

In 1976, Iraq succeeded in buying from France a 40-megawatt materials test reactor called the Tammuz-1 reactor, or Osiraq reactor, that ran on weapons-grade uranium fuel. In 1979, Iraq established a radiochemical laboratory, equipped through a contract with the Italian company SNIA-Techint, suitable for laboratory research on reprocessing. It also acquired a fuel fabrication plant from Italy that was suitable for making natural uranium targets for secret irradiation in the Osiraq reactor.

Iraqi teams calculated that the Osiraq reactor could conservatively produce about 5 kilograms to 7 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per year. This value could be higher or lower depending on how the targets were arranged in the reactor; it also depended on the frequency of visits by IAEA inspectors and French personnel. The Iraqis believed that the safeguards on the reactor, which would have included periodic inspections and surveillance cameras, could have been defeated. Prior to visits by IAEA inspectors and French personnel, Iraq planned to pull out the unsafeguarded targets. Iraq had also developed plans to defeat the cameras.

Before Iraq could illicitly produce any plutonium and put the IAEA's safeguards to the test, however, Israel bombed the reactor in June 1981, shortly before the reactor was scheduled to go into operation. The radiochemical laboratory and fuel fabrication plant were not bombed. Later, the fabrication facility was used to produce unsafeguarded targets which were irradiated in a Russian-supplied research reactor to produce plutonium. The reactor also irradiated bismuth targets to make polonium-210, a material used in beryllium-polonium neutron initiators which trigger the nuclear explosion. Material from the targets was extracted in the Italian radiochemical laboratory, which was expanded in the early 1980s.